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This article will analyze the most significant changes in the manner 
in which individuals who are charged with the crime of rape are 
prosecuted for that offense.  In the last thirty five years, there has been a 
steady erosion of the due process rights of those accused of rape.  I have 
designated the first stage of “reforms,”2 which affected the arrest, pre-
trial, and trial phases of rape prosecutions, as the First Wave of rape 
reform.  The Second Wave are the more recent changes in the law that 
have focused on measures, such as sexual registry or civil commitment 
statutes, that restrict the freedoms of those convicted of sexual assault in 
the hope of enhanced community safety. 
A full comprehension of the statutory enactment and judicial 
creation of, for example, the doctrine of affirmative consent,3 requires an 
examination of the context in which the doctrine arose.  Decisions, such 
as that of the New Jersey Supreme Court in M.T.S.,4 or in the legislative 
enactments of the Wisconsin Sexual Assault in the Third Degree 
statute,5 or in the Florida Sexual Battery Offense Law,6 or in the 
Criminal Code of the State of Washington7 did not occur in a vaccum.  
As is the case with virtually all of the reforms that this article will 
analyze, affirmative consent may be understood as a somewhat natural 
 2. Rape scholars have consistently used the word “reforms” to refer to the changes in rape 
laws which have occurred since the 1970s.  This article uses this term reluctantly, since “reform” 
indicates positive and progressive change, and I do not believe that all of the changes in the 
prosecution of rape have been either positive or progressive.  Choice of language can, of course, be 
of critical import; those individuals, usually non-lawyers, who have championed “tort reform” have 
consciously selected that phrase in order to win popular support for their call for the enactment of 
laws to limit plaintiffs’ recovery in product liability as well as in medical malpractice cases. 
 3. See infra notes 152-206 and accompanying text. 
 4. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1279 (N.J. 1992). 
 5. WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (3) (2007).  The crime is defined as having sexual intercourse with 
a person without the consent of that person.  Id.  Consent is defined in § 940.225(4) as meaning 
“words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent indicating a freely 
given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” 
 6. FLA. STAT. § 794.011(5) (2007) requires an offender committing the crime of sexual 
battery to have acted without the alleged victim’s consent; the Preamble states that commission of 
the crime does not “require any force or violence beyond the force and violence that is inherent in 
the accomplishment of ‘penetration’ or ‘union.’”  The statute requires “intelligent, knowing and 
voluntary consent. . . .”  Id. at § 794.011(1)(a). 
 7. “Consent” is defined to mean “that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual 
intercourse or sexual contact.”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2008). 
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progression from the “reforms” in rape prosecutions that had their origin 
in the mid-1970s.  But a thorough understanding of the rather 
remarkable revamping of our rape laws demands scrutiny, not only of 
the initial reforms, but also of the changes that have taken place in recent 
years such as the enactment of the Louisiana statute providing for the 
death penalty for aggravated rape8 and the eliminations of any statute of 
limitations requirements for the crime of rape in New York9 and 
Connecticut.10 
I.  OVERVIEW OF RAPE REFORM LAW 
To be sure, the rape laws in this country had, up until the 1970s, 
made it quite difficult to convict even the guilty for the crime of rape.  
The peculiarities of rape statutes, coupled with longstanding juror 
cynicism toward women who claimed they were raped by an 
acquaintance, led to the revelation in the landmark study of jurors by 
Kalven and Zeisel in the 1960s that jurors were more inclined to acquit 
defendants in rape cases than was true for any other charge.11  Jurors 
were found to focus not just on the legal issues involved relating to force 
used and lack of consent, but also to be judgmental as to the alleged 
victim’s character and provocative conduct and ways that the woman 
could have contributed to the occurrence.12  When judges were 
questioned as to their reactions to jurors’ acquittals of defendants in rape 
cases, the judges in almost 50% of the instances would not have been as 
lenient as was the jury.13 
There are many long-standing reasons for jurors’ suspicions, and 
those suspicions may well reflect stereotypical and sexist views about 
the validity of a rape charge.  The alleged victim may just be vindictive 
because the guy she dated never called back to see her again; women 
may subconsciously desire to be raped, fantasize about it and then 
 8. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.42(C) (1996). 
 9. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (McKinney 2006) (saying a prosecution for first 
degree rape can be commenced at any time). 
 10. In August 2007, the Connecticut governor signed legislation eradicating the statute of 
limitations for the six most serious sexual assault crimes as long as the crime had been reported to 
the police within five years of the attack and the perpetrator can be identified through DNA 
evidence.  Gov. Rell Highlights New Law Eliminating Statute of Limitations in Rape Cases with 
DNA Evidence, U.S. ST. NEWS, Aug. 21, 2007, available at  
http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=2791&Q=391712.  Jodi Rell, the Governor, called 
the legislation a “major step forward for crime victims in our state.”  Id. 
 11. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 249-57 (1966). 
 12. Id. at 249-50. 
 13. Id. at 253-54. 
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believe that their fantasy actually occurred; a long-term boyfriend 
decided to end the relationship and the rejected woman wished to 
retaliate; the complaining witness was just after money and believed that 
the threat of bringing a rape charge (particularly against a politician, 
celebrity, or sports hero) would lead to a cash settlement.  The often 
used term “cry rape” is indicative of the traditional suspicion that men, 
in particular, have regarding rape accusations.14  Male jurors may 
identify with the male defendant and fear that they themselves may be 
subjected in the future to such a charge.  This fear, Susan Brownmiller 
concluded in her 1975 groundbreaking work on rape, “is based on the 
cherished male assumption that female persons tend to lie.”15 
The rape reform movement began in earnest in the 1970s as part of 
the feminist movement with leading women’s rights organizations, such 
as the National Organization of Women, developing task forces on rape.  
Rape laws were viewed as indicative of a patriarchal system of power 
and laws, and women’s groups joined with organizations of police and 
prosecutors and politicians wanting to be seen as “tough on crime” to 
enact a number of highly significant changes to criminal codes across 
the country.  Claims were made that women were extremely reluctant to 
bring rape charges due to undesirable provisions in the criminal codes, 
and a groundbreaking work on rape claimed that there may be twenty 
times more rape occurring than that which was reported.16  Reform was 
needed because, as another leading feminist wrote, rape was so frequent 
an occurrence as to have become a “national pastime.”17  Women’s lives 
were described as being controlled by the fear of rape: 
Most women experience fear of rape as a nagging, gnawing sense that 
something awful could happen, an angst that keeps them from doing 
things they want or need to do. . . . Women’s fear of rape is a sense 
that one must always be on guard, vigilant and alert, a feeling that 
causes a woman to tighten with anxiety if someone is walking too 
closely behind her, especially at night.18 
The goals of the reformers were lofty indeed.  The desire was “to 
 14. See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 313, 370 
(1975). 
 15. Id. at 369. 
 16. Id. at 175.  Others, however, believed the ratio to be far lower.  See, e.g., M. JOAN 
MCDERMOTT, RAPE VICTIMIZATION IN 26 AMERICAN CITIES 43 (1979). 
 17. Germaine Greer, Seduction Is a Four Letter Word, reprinted in SEXUAL DEVIANCE AND 
SEXUAL DEVIANTS 327 (Erich Goade & Richard Troiden eds., 1974). 
 18. MARGARET GORDON & STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR: THE SOCIAL COST OF 
RAPE 2 (1991). 
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improve male behavior, not merely by curbing forcible rape, but also by 
eliminating aggressive seduction. . . . The aim here is to abolish the 
traditional sexual roles. . . .”19  Some of the proposed changes “would 
potentially shift public perceptions of women and their role in sexual 
relationships.”20  The goals were specifically instrumentalist as well: to 
encourage more women to come forward and press charges after a rape, 
and to change the rape laws in ways that would be likely to result in a 
higher conviction rate of those charged with rape.21 
But it was not just jury prejudice and doubts about the credibility of 
women who claimed to be raped that was responsible for the high 
acquittal rates, it was the fact that the law itself set up barriers to 
conviction that were not true for other crimes.  First and foremost, 
perhaps, was the requirement that there be corroboration for the 
woman’s claim that she had been raped.  Our criminal justice system did 
not require corroboration for any other crime; were the jury to find an 
alleged victim of any other offense to be credible, the jury could convict 
solely on the word of that individual.  Such was not the case for rape.22 
II.  THE REQUIREMENT FOR CORROBORATION 
Corroboration of the woman’s claim was required because of the 
general acceptance of the notorious claim by Sir Matthew Hale that an 
allegation of rape is “easily to be made and hard to be proved, and 
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent.”23  
John Henry Wigmore, the American icon of evidence, was even more 
damning of a woman’s claim.  In the highly influential treatise, Evidence 
in Trials at Common Law,24  Wigmore instructed that the findings of 
modern psychiatry have revealed that women’s “psychic complexes are 
 19. David Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 478 (2000). 
 20. Nicholas Little, From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an 
Affirmative Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2005). 
 21. See, e.g., James Galvin, Rape: A Decade of Reform, 31 CRIME & DELINQ. 163, 165 
(1985). 
 22. The requirement that there be corroboration for the crime of rape was all the more 
problematic since rapes are commonly committed privately in the home of the attacker or victim 
and when no witnesses would be present.  See, e.g., Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: 
Repeal, Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365 (1972). 
 23. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 635 (London 
Professional Books 1971).  Hale was the Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in England.  
This treatise was first published in 1736 and has been enormously significant in the development of 
American law. 
 24. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (James H. Chadbourn 
rev. ed., 1970). 
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multifarious, distorted by inherent defects, partly by diseased 
derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad social environment, 
partly by temporary physiological or emotional conditions.”25  But it 
was not just that women had such problems, it was that these complexes 
led to the “contriving false charges of sexual offenses by men. . . one 
must infer that many innocent men have gone to prison because of tales 
whose falsity could not be exposed.”26  What Wigmore recommended 
and instructed was that, “No judge should ever let a sex-offence charge 
go to the jury, unless the female complainant’s social history and mental 
makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.”27 
The Model Penal Code,28 designed by experts in the criminal 
justice field to serve as an example of an appropriate criminal code for a 
jurisdiction to adopt,29 stated that there should be no conviction for 
sexual offenses “upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged 
victim.”30  Corroboration was required in this unique instance because of 
“the difficulty of determining the truth with respect to alleged sexual 
activities carried out in private”31 and the “jury shall be instructed to 
evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special 
care in view of the emotional involvement of the witness . . . .”32 
Corroboration could take the form of vaginal injuries, deep 
scratches or wounds on the woman or man’s body, torn clothing, or 
neighbors’ testimony about hearing screams for help.  By 1974, 35 states 
had rejected the concept of requiring corroboration.33  Twelve years 
 25. Id. at 736. 
 26. Id. 
 27. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIAL AT COMMON LAW (3d ed. 1940).  See MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 
253-57 (1971) for a review of the literature maintaining that a woman’s subconscious desire to be 
raped and violently attacked led to fabrications and fantasies about actually having been raped. 
 28. MODEL PENAL CODE (Official Draft 1962). 
 29. Academics and practitioners spent 10 years developing the Code to provide the “basis for 
comprehensive legislative reform in every American jurisdiction.”  Id. at pmbl.  The American Law 
Institute claims that in the twenty years following the publication of the Code, thirty-four states 
enacted criminal codes based, at least, to some degree, on the Code.  Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty years 
of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL. L. REV. 943, 948 (1999). 
 30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (Official Draft 1962) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., 
concurring).  The rejections were straightforward and unambiguous.  See, e.g., WASH REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9A.44.020 (West 2008) (“[I]t shall not be necessary that the testimony of the alleged victim 
be corroborated.”). 
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later, only 8 states still required corroboration.34  There is no state 
which, as of 2001, still generally requires corroboration,35 although 
Texas does so when the offense has not been reported until more than a 
year after the date of the allege 36
III.  REQUIREMENT OF “UTMOST” OR “REASONABLE” RESISTANCE 
Historically, in order for an accused to be convicted of rape, it was 
required to be proven that the victim “resisted to the utmost.”  As the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin stated in 1906: “[T]here must be the most 
vehement exercise of every physical means or faculty within the 
woman’s power to resist the penetration of her person, and this must be 
shown to persist until the offense is consummated.”37  It was believed 
that any good woman who didn’t want the intercourse to occur, would 
fight it off with every bone in her body.  As the Mississippi Supreme 
Court stated, “a mere tactical surrender in the face of an assumed 
superior physical force is not enough.  Where the penalty for the 
defendant may be supreme, so must resistance be unto the uttermost.”38 
There clearly was a connection between concerns about women 
fabricating rape charges and the requirement that to convict someone of 
rape, it must be shown that the victim fought and struggled to the 
utmost; how else would it be known that the woman hadn’t really 
desired the intercourse?39  Nevertheless, as years went by, the 
impracticality of requiring such combative behavior on the part of the 
victim became clear.  Police departments began to instruct women that, 
at times, they should not fight to the utmost; such struggling just resulted 
in the victim’s sustaining great physical injuries from an assault that 
would accompany the sexual assault.  Reformers were able to cite 
empirical research which indicated that there are far more serious 
injuries for women who resisted a forcible sexual attack.40  States, in 
 34. Cassia Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and Rape Law 
Reforms, 39 JURIMETRIC J. 119, 126 (1999). 
 35. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 
374 (7th ed. 2001). 
 36. Id. at 374 n.33 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38.07 (1998)). 
 37. Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 538 (Wisc. 1906). 
 38. Moss v. State, 45 So.2d 125, 126 (Miss. 1950). 
 39. See ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX AND THE LAW 98 (1984) (saying it is because 
women are viewed as temptresses and liars that the police, prosecutors and judges prefer the alleged 
victim to have fully resisted the intercourse). 
 40. See, e.g., AMIR, supra note 27, at 164-71. 
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response, began to adopt the reasonable resistance requirement.41  The 
Oregon Supreme Court42 described this concept: “The woman must 
resist by more than mere words.  Her resistance must be reasonably 
proportionate to her strength and her opportunities.”43 
Reasonable resistance, to be sure, would vary depending on the 
circumstances of the attack.  If the man possessed a weapon that clearly 
would be used if needed to overcome any resistance by the female, then 
none ought to be required.  Sometimes, reasonable resistance may mean 
none at all.44  If, however, the assault were to occur in an apartment 
building in New York City, then screams for help and struggling to 
delay the intercourse may prove fruitful; however, there may be no point 
in such resistance if one is being attacked in a desolate field.45  Even 
though our common sense might not lead to such a conclusion, studies 
have found that it is psychologically beneficial for a woman to have 
physically resisted the sexual assault.46 
Surely, when a jury hears testimony about the victim’s physical 
resistance, such resistance is of import in determining that there has been 
nonconsensual intercourse.  A male defendant whose claim is that, “I 
thought she was consenting,” is much less likely to be believed if the 
jury finds that there was physical resistance on the part of the victim.  
Nonetheless, approximately half of the states have changed their rape 
laws to no longer require there to have been any physical resistance;47 
 41. See, e.g., State v. Harris, 174 A.2d 645, 648 (N.J. App. 1961) (declaring the resist-to-the-
utmost test to be obsolete). 
 42. State v. Risen, 235 P.2d 764 (Or. 1951). 
 43. Id. at 765. 
 44. The New York State Court of Appeals first expressed this perspective in 1891.  “[T]he 
extent of the resistance required of an assaulted female is governed by the circumstances of the case, 
and the grounds which she has for apprehending the infliction of great bodily harm.”  People v. 
Connor, 126 N.Y. 278, 281 (N.Y. 1891).  See also State v. Terry, 215 A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. App. 
1965) (saying utmost resistance is to be required no more.  The test is whether the woman did 
“resist as much as she possibly can under the circumstances”). 
 45. Traditional Jewish Law is of interest here.  Physical resistance may well be evidence of 
lack of consent, but has never been required as an element to prove a sexual attack.  The crime of 
rape has been defined simply as “sexual intercourse with a woman against her will.”  
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1548 (1972), cited in Beth C. Miller, A Comparison of American and 
Jewish Legal Views on Rape, 5 COLUMB. J. GENDER & L. 182, 194 (1996). 
 46. See, e.g., Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953, 
989-90 (1998).  Anderson concluded that resisting the attack causes the victim to engage in less 
self-blame, require a shortened period for recovery, and create a greater likelihood in seeking 
treatment after the rape.  Id. 
 47. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 329. 
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the focus now has been placed on the defendant’s use, or threatened use, 
of force.48 
In 1975, the state of Michigan enacted rape reform legislation that 
formed the basis for statutory changes in many states; the statute 
eliminated any requirement of physical resistance.49  New York State’s 
current rape statute is typical of many present day states in its defining 
of the requisite “forcible compulsion” as encompassing either the use of 
actual force or the implied or express threat of such use.50  If threats 
articulated by the defendant had paralyzed the capacity of the alleged 
victim to resist and had undermined her will, then the statutory 
requirement of forcible compulsion has been met.  Concerns have often 
arisen as to which is of primary significance: the intention of the accused 
to have threatened the use of force, or the alleged victim’s belief that 
there was such a threat.  The New York case of People v. Evans51 
involved a situation where the defendant had told the alleged victim that 
“I could kill you, I could rape you.  I could hurt you physically.”52  The 
State claimed that those words clearly indicated the defendant’s 
intention to threaten the victim, who, perceiving a threat, proceeded to 
engage in intercourse with the defendant.53  The state Supreme Court 
Judge presiding at the bench trial, however, determined that the 
controlling state of mind regarding whether or not there was a threat of 
force was not that of the alleged victim who perceived a threat, but 
rather that of the man accused of the rape.54  Evans had met the 20 year 
old college student at La Guardia airport where he had gone as part of 
his planned seduction of a vulnerable new arrival to New York City.55  
The defendant posed as a psychologist, and several hours later the young 
woman accompanied the defendant to his apartment.  The defendant 
explained at trial that he uttered the words which were interpreted as 
threatening, merely to inform the woman that she should not put herself 
in such vulnerable positions in the future; were she confronted in a 
similar scenario at some later date with a different man, she may at that 
 48. Id.  The statutory inclusion of the threat to use force was itself a reform.  Id.  During the 
period when utmost resistance was required to have been utilized by the victim, actual force was 
required by the perpetrator.  Id. 
 49. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520i (West 1975). 
 50. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (2006). 
 51. People v. Evans, 379 N.Y.S.2d 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff’d, 390 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1976). 
 52. Id. at 917. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 920-21. 
 55. Id. at 915. 
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time actually be physically at risk.  The Court concluded that there is no 
crime when the “words . . . are taken as a threat by the person who hears 
them, but are not intended as a threat by the person who utters 
them . . . .”56 
IV.  RAPE SHIELD LEGISLATION 
One of the most significant and far-reaching changes in the 
prosecution of rape has been the enactment of what is commonly 
referred to as rape shield laws.  These laws protect, i.e., shield, the 
complaining witness from being asked questions about her sexual 
history prior to the occurrence of the rape.  There were two primary 
reasons for these laws.  First, it was believed that many women would 
not come forward to report the fact that they’ve been raped if they knew 
they’d be subjected to questions about their sexual past.  Secondly, there 
was great concern that jurors were being unduly influenced and 
prejudiced by hearing information about prior sexual involvements of 
women who were claiming at trial that they had not consented to 
relations with the defendant.  It was believed by many that if the woman 
had consented to have sexual relations with a number of people in the 
past, it was more likely that she had done so with the defendant on the 
day in question.  Additionally, changes in the rape shield statutes could 
promote important policies and “reverse certain antiquated 
misconceptions concerning rape.”57  A lot to ask for. 
At common law, questions concerning the prior sexual history of 
the alleged rape victim were admissible for two reasons.  First, it was 
believed that a woman who had been sexually active was a less credible 
witness in general.  Secondly, a woman who was unchaste—defined as 
participating in either pre-marital or extra-marital sex—was thought 
more likely to have agreed to have relations with this defendant.  A 
standard jury instruction that had been used in California illustrates the 
point: “A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible 
rape, but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented 
to sexual intercourse would be more likely to consent again.”58 
The goal of the reformers to preclude questions about the 
complaining witness’s prior sexual involvements gained rapid 
 56. Id. at 921.  The court did acknowledge that the complaining witness indeed “was 
intimidated” and “perhaps was terrified.”  Id. at 919. 
 57. Drake v. State, 836 P.2d 52, 54 (Nev. 1992). 
 58. Harriet Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for 
the Second Decade, 70 MINN. L. REV. 763, 783 n.96 (1986) (emphasis added). 
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momentum, and within one decade every state had enacted some version 
of a rape shield law.  The first significant shield law was passed in the 
state of Michigan; the 1975 statute has been deemed to constitute “the 
most important model for reform.”59  The language was simple, clear 
and to the point: “Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual 
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct, and reputation 
evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted . . . .”60 
Congress, however, failed to amend the Federal Rules of evidence 
until 1978; the “Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act” of that year 
eventually became Rule 412 of the Federal Rules.  The goals of the 
legislation were clear.  Senator Joseph Biden described the law as one 
which “will eliminate the defense strategy. . . of placing the victim and 
her reputation on trial in lieu of the defendant.”61  President Jimmy 
Carter, upon signing the bill into law, stated the law would “end the 
public degradation of rape victims” and “prevent a defendant from 
making the victim’s private life the issue in the trial.”62 
The shield statutes attempted to avoid not just the re-victimization 
of the complaining witness by direct and potentially embarrassing 
questioning of her, but also the testimony by prior sexual partners of the 
woman, who could inform the jury about her reputation for 
promiscuity.63  The more past sexual involvements of a woman, the 
more jurors may see her as being in control of, and responsible for, her 
sexual involvement with men in general, and with this defendant in 
particular.  It is, in fact, common in acquaintance rape situations that the 
woman had a history of sexual involvements; it is those women who are 
more likely to be socially adventuresome and find themselves in bars or 
 59. Leigh Bienen, Rape III, National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. RPTR. 171, 172 (1980). 
 60. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.520j(1) (West 1991).  The Rape shield statutes of some 
states attempt to be more comprehensive.  The following is a portion of the State of Washington 
Rape Shield Statute: “Evidence of the victim’s past sexual behavior including but not limited to the 
victim’s marital history, divorce history, or general reputation for promiscuity, nonchastity, or 
sexual mores contrary to community standards is inadmissible . . . .”  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
9A.44.020(2) (2008). 
 61. 124 Cong. Rec. 36,256 (1978). 
 62. Statement on Signing H.R. 4727 into Law, 14 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1902 (Oct. 30, 
1978).  Rule 412 was extended by amendment in 1994 to apply the shield to all criminal cases, not 
just those where the defendant was charged with rape. 
 63. Courts have often highlighted the need to avoid placing the alleged victim on trial as a 
justification for rape shield laws.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 227 (1981) 
(saying evidence of prior sexual history diverts the jury from its proper focus on the alleged acts of 
the defendant). 
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clubs where they would meet men interested in sexual encounters in the 
first place.64 
Another factor that may impact jurors is the perception that a 
woman who has frequently engaged in sexual relations is less likely to 
be psychologically damaged by an acquaintance rape than would be the 
case for a woman with little or no prior sexual relationships.65  Jurors 
may, consciously or subconsciously, believe in some way that a woman 
with an active sexual life takes on an “assumption of risk” that she’ll 
meet a guy who won’t take “no” for an answer.  What is perceived to be 
a “high risk lifestyle” may effectively lead to “contributory negligence.” 
But the shield laws have most certainly not been without their 
critics.  The limitation on the ability of defense counsel to conduct a full 
and comprehensive cross examination of the alleged rape victim has 
proven to be of much concern.  The right to confront one’s accusers is a 
basic tenet of our system of criminal justice.  The Sixth Amendment 
provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor . . . .”66  The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause has been 
held to incorporate the Sixth Amendment and, therefore, such guarantees 
apply to state prosecutions.  The Supreme Court, in Washington v. 
Texas,67 cited the 14th Amendment provision that no state “deprive any 
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law”68 and 
concluded that “the right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and then 
compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to 
present a defense . . . .”69  The ability to present relevant testimony on 
the defendant’s own behalf, the Court continued, is a “fundamental 
element of due process of law.”70 
The goal of the reformers to shift the focus of the trial from the 
alleged rape victim (her sexual background, what clothing she may have 
been wearing, her presence at a singles’ bar at 2:00 in the morning) to 
 64. One study of college women found that women who have stated that they have been raped 
had, in fact, a greater number of sexual partners than the general population of female students.  
Mary P. Koss, The Hidden Rape Victim: Personality, Attitudinal, and Situational Characteristics, 9 
PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 193, 208 (1985). 
 65. See generally Hubert S. Feild, Rape Trials and Juror’s Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis 
of the Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Case Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 264, 
273, 279 (1979). 
 66. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 67. Wash. v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 68. Id. at 15 n.2. 
 69. Id. at 19. 
 70. Id. 
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what the defendant allegedly did, has proven to be quite difficult.  The 
jurors’ focus on mens rea, the defendant’s state of mind, will raise 
questions about what the victim herself had been doing which may have 
impacted upon the defendant’s perceptions of what was occurring.  
There is, for instance, no way of shielding the woman from the fact that 
she had gone to a bar, then to the defendant’s apartment in the middle of 
the night.  Even though at trial the victim is shielded from questions 
about her past sexual relations with others, there is no control over what 
inferences, prejudices, and conclusions the jurors may form because of 
her actions that night. 
All rape shield statutes contain exceptions, which do permit 
questioning of the alleged victim’s sexual past in the following 
instances: a) questions relating to the sexual history with this defendant 
can be asked in order for the jury to be able to assess most fairly what 
occurred between them that night,71 b) if the woman has been convicted 
of prostitution in the years prior to this occurrence because it’s believed 
that the conviction may be seen by the jurors as affecting her credibility, 
c) a catch-all category generally providing the trial judge with discretion 
to permit questioning if it’s determined to be required to best serve the 
interests of justice.72 
The presumption that the victim will be shielded is only that, a 
presumption.73  Judges are left with the overall discretion as to what any 
particular trial may demand.  In the Kobe Bryant case, where the issue 
was whether the acknowledged sex was consensual or forced by the 
 71. It is generally believed that such information is needed to provide a context for the 
relationship between the defendant and the woman who is claiming that she was raped.  All states, 
whether by statute or court decision, have this exception to the rape shield laws. 
 72. In Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36 (2004), a case involving the right of a defendant to 
engage in cross examination, Justice Scalia emphasized that the framers of the Constitution knew 
that judges “could not always be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people . . . [and] were loath to 
leave too much discretion in judicial hands.”  Id. at 1373.  Judges may well choose to act in ways 
that are designed to protect themselves from public criticism or controversy and determine that the 
safest course of conduct is to just prohibit the questioning. 
 73. See, for example, COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(1) (2007), which says: 
Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s or a witness’s prior or subsequent sexual 
conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s or a witness’s sexual conduct, and reputation 
evidence of the victim’s or a witness’s sexual conduct . . . shall be presumed to be 
irrelevant except: 
a) Evidence of the victim’s or witness’s prior or subsequent sexual conduct with the 
actor; 
b) Evidence of specific instance of sexual activity showing the source or origin or semen, 
pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual intercourse offered for the purpose 
of showing that the act or acts charged were or were not committed by the defendant. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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famous basketball player, the judge was confronted with the highly 
charged claim that testimony that showed that the alleged victim had 
intercourse with another man within fifteen hours after the claimed rape 
by Bryant should be permitted “in the interest of justice.”  The Colorado 
rape shield statute provides that, “if the court finds that the evidence 
proposed to be offered regarding the sexual conduct of the victim or 
witness is relevant to a material issue to the case, the court shall order 
that evidence may be introduced . . . .”74  Jurors might appropriately 
determine that if the victim had been violently raped in Bryant’s hotel 
room as claimed, she wouldn’t have so shortly thereafter found another 
man with whom to once again have intercourse. 
The prosecutor’s case fell apart after of the judge’s ruling that the 
rape shield statute in this case would not prohibit defense questions 
about the woman engaging in sexual relations with another man within 
15 hours after the alleged sexual attack by Bryant.  As the Denver 
prosecutor told the Court, “the victim has informed us, after much of her 
own labored deliberation, that she does not want to proceed with this 
trial.”75  There has been a suspicion in recent years that those who make 
such claims against celebrities might be doing so to extort funds in 
exchange for keeping silent.  Even in the Kobe Bryant case where 
criminal charges were dismissed, a handsome civil settlement resulted 
just six months later.76 
A judge’s use of discretion may often be guided by an analysis of 
the probative aspect versus the prejudicial nature of the proffered 
testimony.  Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides for a balancing 
between the probative value of the desired evidence versus the 
prejudicial impact such evidence would have on the fact finders.77  To 
an extent, this balancing act is what some rape trials entail—a potentially 
embarrassing and degrading examination of a woman’s sexual past, 
versus the need for the jury to hear all the evidence that may 
appropriately have influenced the defendant and all the testimony that 
 74. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-407(2)(e) (2007). 
 75. Howard Pankratz & Steve Lipsher, Dismissed Prosecution: Accuser is Unable to Proceed 
with Trial Defense: Bryant Apologizes for Actions “That Night,” DENVER POST, Sept. 2, 2004, at 
A1. 
 76. Jon Sarche, Kobe Bryant Settles Civil Suit, Terms Not Disclosed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Mar. 3, 2005. 
 77. Rule 403 states: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.”  FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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may prove critical in assessing the reliability and credibility of the 
complaining witness. 
The Supreme Court, while never specifically ruling as to the 
constitutionality of rape shield laws, did give tacit approval to such 
statutes in Michigan v. Lucas.78  The Court, while ruling on a notice 
requirement unique to the Michigan statute, noted that the rape shield 
protections reflect “a valid legislative determination that rape victims 
deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and 
unnecessary invasions of privacy.”79 
The Court, however, has repeatedly emphasized the fundamental 
import of the right to cross examine one’s accuser.80  In Davis v. 
Alaska,81 the prosecution maintained that cross examination of the 
primary witness testifying against the defendant should not be permitted 
to encompass questions about the juvenile delinquency record of that 
witness because it would violate the right to privacy and create 
embarrassment.82  Alaska law specifically prohibited cross examination 
on such matters in order to protect against public exposure of offenses 
committed while a juvenile.  The Court acknowledged that the desire to 
protect privacy rights was a valid concern, but such concerns were 
“outweighed by [the defendant’s] right to probe into the influence of 
possible bias in the testimony of a crucial identification witness.”83 
The impact of the Davis decision was immediate, but, strangely, 
short-lived.  Very soon after Davis was decided, a Maryland appeals 
court in State v. De Lawder84 reversed its earlier holding85 which had 
supported the prohibition of defense counsel’s questions concerning the 
prior sexual relations of the woman claiming to have been raped by the 
defendant.86  The Maryland court cited the strong language used in 
 78. 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
 79. Id. at 149-50. 
 80. Indeed, the Court has noted that this right dates back to Roman times.  Coy v. Iowa, 487 
U.S. 1012, 1015-16 (1988).  See also Crawford v. Wash., 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 81. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
 82. Id. at 310.  The prosecutor moved, pre-trial, for a protective order to prevent reference to 
the witness’s juvenile record by the defense on cross examination.  The witness had been 
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent at age sixteen due to the commission of two burglaries.  Id. at 311.  
The prosecutor took the position that exposure of the witness’s juvenile record would impair the 
rehabilitative goals of the state.  Id. at 319. 
 83. Id. at 319. 
 84. State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
 85. The Maryland court concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis needed to be 
applied retroactively.  Id. at 455. 
 86. Id. 
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Davis regarding the critical import of the right of cross examination87 to 
now hold that the objective that the alleged rape victim “fulfill her public 
duty to testify free from embarrassment and with her reputation 
unblemished must fall before the right of an accused to seek out the truth 
in the process of defending himself.”88  Nonetheless, the momentum for 
enactment of rape shield legislation continued after Davis and De 
Lawder with, however, some major exceptions to the restriction of the 
right of cross examination. 
One prime limitation is when the defense wants to introduce 
evidence of the alleged victim’s prior sexual conduct to show that the 
woman has a motive to lie about the incident with the defendant.  The 
Supreme Court, in Olden v. Kentucky,89 considered a situation where 
defense claimed that the woman had fabricated the sexual assault in 
order to protect herself from her live-in boyfriend’s discovering that she 
had cheated on him.90  The trial court judge prohibited questions 
designed to reveal to the jurors the existence of that live-in relationship, 
based in part on the judge’s concern that the Kentucky jurors would be 
prejudiced against the white complaining witness upon learning that her 
boyfriend was black.91  The trial court refused to permit defense counsel 
to question the witness about her living arrangements even after she lied 
on the witness stand by stating as part of the prosecutor’s direct 
examination that she was living with her mother.92  The Supreme Court, 
citing its holding in Davis v. Alaska,93 held that “[s]peculation as to the 
effect of jurors’ racial biases cannot justify exclusion of cross 
examination with such strong potential to demonstrate the falsity of [the 
defendant’s] testimony.”94 
The Olden Court emphasized that the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment requires the defendant to be able to expose to the jury 
facts which may challenge the reliability of a witness.95  A more 
 87. The Supreme Court emphasized the import of cross examination as a primary aspect of 
the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, stating that “[c]ross-examination is the principal 
means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested.”  Davis, 415 
U.S. at 316. 
 88. DeLawder, 344 A.2d at 455 (emphasis added). 
 89. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988). 
 90. Id. at 230. 
 91. Id. at 230, 232. 
 92. Id. at 230. 
 93. See supra note 87. 
 94. Olden, 488 U.S. at 232.  The Court added that “the exposure of a witness’ motivation in 
testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-
examination.”  Id. at 231. 
 95. Id. 
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common motive to lie about being raped is illustrated in State v. 
DeLawder.96  In that case, the defense claim was that the young girl was 
terrified of telling her mother that she had gotten pregnant from 
consensual sex with her boyfriend, and chose, instead, to tell her very 
strict mother that, “I’ve been raped; now, I am pregnant . . . .”97 
V.  JUDICIAL EXPANSION OF THE CONCEPT OF RAPE SHIELD 
Courts have not only been generally supportive of rape shield 
legislation, but have even expanded it beyond the scope of the drafters.  
A prime example of this is the decision of the Third Circuit in 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Scuito.98  The defense had requested 
that the trial judge grant its motion to have a psychiatric examination 
conducted of the complaining witness.99  The attorney’s affidavit 
submitted to the Court stated that “any number of persons in the 
community” had told counsel that the alleged victim “appears to be 
often, if not almost constantly, in a ‘spaced out’ or trancelike state; I 
have personally observed this.”100  Counsel added that he had been 
informed by individuals that the complainant is addicted to drugs and “is 
frequently in altered states of consciousness therefrom.”101 
One would think that evidence of a complaining witness’s use of 
“mind-altering [hallucinogenic] drugs”102 and of a “personality which 
fantasizes to extremes”103 goes to the heart of the overriding issue of the 
credibility of the witness.  There is no issue presented here relating to 
questioning the witness about her prior sexual relations, so one may not 
see the relevance of the federal rape shield statute, Rule 412 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.104  Yet, the Third Circuit upheld the decision 
of the trial court that Rule 412 does apply, not based on the “letter” of 
412, but on the “spirit;”105 the spirit being to prevent the victim from 
being put on trial.106  Such an incursion on the right to cross-exam and 
 96. State v. DeLawder, 344 A.2d 446 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1975). 
 97. Id. at 453; see also Johnson v. State, 632 A.2d 152, 161 (Md. 1993) (saying that evidence 
was admissible that suggests the alleged victim had a motive to lie in accusing defendant of rape). 
 98. Virgin Islands v. Scuito, 623 F.2d 869 (3d Cir. 1980). 
 99. Id. at 874. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. 
 105. Scuito, 623 F. 2d at 874-75. 
 106. Id. at 876 (citing 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S 
EVIDENCE § 412(01), at 412-19 (1979)). 
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confront one’s accusers could well be seen as prohibiting many instances 
of relevant questioning that certainly challenges the credibility of one 
who accuses another of a crime.  A serious and comprehensive attack on 
the veracity, honesty, and reliability of a witness’s testimony might well 
be characterized as an attempt to put the victim on trial and, therefore, be 
improper. 
At times, trial courts’ rulings in the name of rape shield statutes 
have been unfortunate indeed.  Consider the court’s action in Neeley v. 
Commonwealth.107  The alleged victim was a 14 year old white girl who 
claimed that a black male had broken into her house and forcibly raped 
her.108  Neeley, a black man, denied ever having entered the house that 
night at all.  The Commonwealth of Virginia introduced expert evidence 
from a technician at a forensic laboratory that a hair which was 
“characteristic of hair from a person of African-American descent” was 
found on the girl’s cervix.109  The defendant wished to question the 
complainant about the intercourse she had had with her boyfriend, who 
was also black, before the alleged rape.  Defense wished to counter the 
prosecution’s claim that the hair from a black man found on the woman 
was evidence of the guilt of the defendant.  Defense counsel had an 
expert he was prepared to call to testify and who would maintain that the 
hair found could well have come from the girl’s boyfriend.110 
The trial court’s ruling in Neeley prohibited the defendant from 
introducing evidence to provide an alternative explanation for the hair 
that was found on the complainant.  The court’s ruling prohibiting any 
testimony that would involve evidence of the alleged rape victim’s prior 
sexual relations, in the name of protecting the girl from embarrassment, 
provides an alarming example of the use of rape shield statutes to thwart 
justice.  It took a decision of the Court of Appeals of Virginia to 
conclude that the operation of the statute in this case denied the 
defendant his “constitutional rights of compulsory process, confrontation 
and due process . . . .”111 
Another instance of a court broadly, and, I suggest, inappropriately, 
applying a rape shield statute to encompass sexual conduct other than 
the alleged victim’s prior sexual relations, is the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
 107. Neeley v. Commonwealth, 437 S.E.2d 721 (Va. App. 1993). 
 108. Id. at 722. 
 109. Id. at 723. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Neeley, 437 S.E.2d at 726-27.  The court held that the utilization of the rape shield statute 
in this instance denied the defendant his constitutional right to present relevant evidence.  Id. 
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in Wood v. Alaska.112  There was no dispute as to whether or not 
intercourse had occurred; the issue before the jury was whether there 
was consent.  Wood wanted to introduce evidence that prior to the night 
in question, the alleged rape victim had told him that she had posed for 
photographs for Penthouse magazine, that she had acted in pornographic 
films, and that she received payment to engage in sex in a room full of 
mirrors while people photographed her.113  Wood maintained that the 
woman had shown him the Penthouse photos114 and that he perceived 
her conduct to have been a sexual come-on.  The defendant’s attempts to 
bring these issues out before the jury failed because the judge ruled that 
such testimony was prohibited under the rape shield law in Alaska.115  
The defendant was convicted of sexual assault.116 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals acknowledged that since the 
conduct Wood desired to introduce was publicly displayed in nationally 
distributed magazines and films, no privacy rights of the complainant 
would be violated by introducing the information at trial.117  The Court 
also accepted Wood’s claim that the information that the complainant 
provided Wood might well have established a certain type of 
relationship between the two, but, nevertheless, concluded that the 
potential prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.118  
Furthermore, any introduction of such evidence may have “confused” 
the jury.119 
The Court determined that the mere willingness to have posed for 
Penthouse and to act in sexual films was of no relevance as to whether 
she would have wanted to have had sex with Wood.  What the Court 
failed to give sufficient weight to is the significance of the woman’s 
making a special effort to impart that information to Wood and how he 
may have interpreted the motivation and interests of the woman 
providing him with such detailed information about her past sexual 
conduct.  The woman’s discussions, initiated by her, of her pornographic 
 112. Wood v. Alaska, 957 F.2d 1544 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 113. Id. at 1546. 
 114. The court accepted this as fact.  Id. at 1547. 
 115. The trial judge issued a pretrial protective order excluding all the above mentioned 
evidence.  Id. at 1547. 
 116. Id.  The defendant unsuccessfully appealed in the Alaska state courts and the federal 
district court denied his habeas corpus writ based on his Sixth Amendment claim.  Id. at 1547-48. 
 117. It was clear that the purpose of the woman’s exposure was to have her images seen by the 
public.  Id. at 1552.  It would be difficult to maintain that the woman would be embarrassed by the 
revelation of her photos or acting career. 
 118. Id. at 1554. 
 119. Id. 
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acting and modeling career, could most certainly be deemed to be 
sexually provocative and taken by Wood to mean she was interested in a 
sexual relationship with him.  The mere facts by themselves that she had 
posed nude and acted in pornographic films might appropriately be 
precluded by the rape shield statute, but her communications to Wood 
about her past and the showing of nude photographs of herself to Wood 
are quite another matter.  A jury may well have regarded such actions as 
more than of “limited probative value,”120 and more than just “relevant 
to a limited degree.”121 
VI.  THE MARITAL EXEMPTION FROM THE CRIME OF RAPE 
To be sure, one of the most significant reforms in rape law has been 
the elimination of the marital exception for the commission of crime of 
rape.  Once again, we turn for historical perspective to the seminal work 
of Lord Matthew Hale: “[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape 
committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual 
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this 
kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.”122  The first case in 
America to recognize the common law exemption for marital rape was 
the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Commonwealth v. Fogerty.123 
There are four primary justifications that have been offered over the 
years for the marital exception.  The first was that the wife was viewed 
as the property of the husband and had no legal identity of her own; the 
woman, sexual parts included, belonged to the man.124  Secondly, the 
marriage contract was deemed to encompass an agreement for sexual 
relations; it was the husband’s conjugal right and his wife was obliged to 
obey his commands.125  Thirdly, it was believed that the state should 
simply keep out of the private relationship that exists between a married 
 120. Id. at 1546. 
 121. Id.  In a case that offers a contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Wood, the court in 
People v. Jovanovic, 700 N.Y.S.2d 156, 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999), held that the defendant should 
have been able to make the jury aware of provocative e-mails discussing sado-masochistic sex 
between the parties so as to “effectively place the complainant in a somewhat less innocent and 
possibly more realistic light.” 
 122. HALE, supra note 23, at 629. 
 123. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. 489 (Mass. 1857). 
 124. See 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 189 (1941) (saying the wife’s legal existence was 
“incorporated into that of the husband”). 
 125. Such was not the Biblical perspective on sexual activity in marriage.  Relations were to 
occur only when each party so chose and marital rape was indeed an offense.  Miller, supra note 45, 
at 207-08. 
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couple.  As the Commentary to the Model Penal Code’s marital rape 
exemption explains, the exception “avoids [an] unwarranted intrusion of 
the penal law into the life of the family.”126  It was also believed that any 
involvement of the criminal law after an accusation of rape would cause 
any reconciliation between the spouses to be more difficult and would 
ultimately harm the marriage and make things even more difficult for 
any children involved.127  Some maintained that the exemption was 
required in order to prevent wives from falsely claiming to be raped in 
order to gain an advantage in any divorce or child custody litigation. 
And, lastly, a rationale of particular controversy has been the claim 
that the harm, the injury to a sexually assaulted wife, is far less than the 
impact on other women.  The Model Penal Code’s Commentary 
illustrates this theme: “Where the attacker stands in an ongoing relation 
of sexual intimacy, that evil, as distinct from the force used to compel 
submission, may well be thought qualitatively different.”128  There are 
many, however, who maintain that the actual psychological harm that 
results from such an attack by an intimate who had once been so trusted, 
is great indeed.129  Marital rape may be, in fact, seen as the ultimate 
humiliation.130 
In spite of the offensiveness of the “it’s not so bad if the attacker is 
someone you’re married to” claim, the focus of the rape reform 
movement of the 1970s did not initially include the marital exemption.  
However, it is interesting to note that one of the prime concerns of the 
first organized women’s movement dating back to the Seneca Falls 
Convention of 1848, was to oppose any concept of a man’s right to 
engage in coerced sex with his wife.131 
As of early 2008, most states have eliminated the marital 
exemption, although some states deem spousal rape to be a less serious 
 126. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (Official Draft & Revised Cmts. 1980). 
 127. This is a most peculiar view.  One would think that when there has been a forceful sexual 
assault by a husband of his wife that the marriage had already reached a point where reconciliation 
would neither be a goal, nor conceivable. 
 128. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 cmt. 8(c) (Official Draft & Revised Cmts. 1980).  The 
Commentary does indicate that even though the “drastic sanctions of rape” should not apply in the 
spousal context, the charge of assault may well be appropriate.  Id. 
 129. See GERMAINE GREER, SEXUAL DEVIANCE AND SEXUAL DEVIANTS 329-30 (Erich Goode 
& Richard R. Troiden eds., 1974) (saying the harm to a woman who is raped by a complete stranger 
may well be less than the humiliation resulting from the rape by someone who the woman was 
trying to love). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1373, 1377 n.10 (2000). 
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offense than either stranger or acquaintance rape.  Oklahoma132 and 
Kentucky133 still retain limited forms of the spousal exception and 
exclude the spouse, but not others, from prosecution in instances where 
the victim is not mentally able and competent to consent. 
This fundamental change in our laws regarding the marital 
exemption for rape came not just by legislative action,134  but from the 
judiciary as well.  One of the most influential and significant court 
decisions was that of the New York State Court of Appeals in People v. 
Liberta.135  The Court held that “there is no rational basis for 
distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. . . . We 
therefore declare the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute 
to be unconstitutional.”136  And in spite of the long common law 
tradition in England for spousal immunity,137 in 1991 the House of 
Lords eliminated the marital exempti 138
VII.  THE ELEMENT OF MENS REA IN THE CRIME OF RAPE 
A major concern in defining any crime is which mens rea, which 
guilty mind, is required to deem one a criminal.  Historically, in a rape 
prosecution, the guilty defendant must have had the intention to have 
intercourse with a woman without her consent.  If he thought there was 
consent, the act of intercourse would not have constituted the crime of 
rape even if the alleged victim was, in fact, not consenting.  The extreme 
example that is often used to illustrate this point is the case of Director 
of Public Prosecutions Respondent v. Morgan Appellant,139 a 1976 
 132. Oklahoma’s rape statute does not apply to a spouse in numerous situations such as “where 
the victim is incapable through mental illness or any other unsoundness of mind, whether temporary 
or permanent, of giving legal consent.”  There is no exemption if force or the threat of force is used.  
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2007) (defining rape). 
 133. Kentucky exempts spouses who would otherwise be guilty of rape if the victim is 
mentally retarded.  KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.035 (West 2007). 
 134. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-1 (West 1978) (abolishing New Jersey’s marital 
exemption in 1978). 
 135. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E. 2d 567 (N.Y. 1984).  At the time of that decision, forty states 
still retained the marital exemption.  Id. at 572. 
 136. Id. at 573.  The Court also found the designation of “he” as the actor and a “woman” as 
the victim violated the equal protection clause because it exempted females from liability for 
forcible rape.  Id. at 577-78.  The Court did not proceed to strike the entire statute, however, as 
unconstitutional.  The rape statute remained but it was deemed to be, from that point on, gender-
neutral and with no marital exception.  Id. at 59. 
 137. See HALE, supra note 23 and accompanying text; HALE, supra note 122 and 
accompanying text. 
 138. R. Respondent v. R. Appellant, [1991] 1 A.C. 599. 
 139. R. v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182 (H.L.). 
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matter before the House of Lords which characterized the facts 
surrounding the incident as “somewhat bizarre.”140 
Four members of the British Royal Air Force had been drinking in a 
bar when Morgan suggested to his three companions that they return to 
his house to have sex with his wife.  The three friends testified at trial 
that Morgan had told them that his wife would initially struggle and that 
this was the only way she would get “turned on,” and that her resistance 
would be a mere “pretence,” not to be taken seriously.141  Morgan led 
the three others to believe that his wife, in spite of her protests, would 
certainly be consenting to the intercourse.  The men admitted that there 
was some struggle in the wife’s bedroom, but then all the parties 
involved calmed down and engaged in consensual sex.142  The issue 
presented here was clear: Is it rape when a) the alleged victim clearly 
objected to the intercourse but, b) the defendants thought, nevertheless, 
that there was consent.143 
The House of Lords’ decision is a noted one because it adopts such 
an extreme position that is has been an easy target for the rape law 
reformers.144  The trial judge told the jury that the intent of the defendant 
was all-controlling as long as it was based on reason and not completely 
fanciful.145  The House of Lords, considering the matter on appeal, went 
quite a bit further.  Since the mens rea of rape was intent to have 
intercourse without consent, as long as the particular defendant was of 
the belief, however unreasonable, that there was consent, then no 
conviction would be appropriate.146 
Attacks on the House of Lords147 began the next day with a sharply 
critical editorial in The Times of London.148  The decision “does not 
 140. Id. at 186 
 141. Id. at 187, 206. 
 142. Id. at 206.  The alleged victim’s husband was not charged with rape due to the common 
law marital exemption existing at the time in Britain.  Id. at 205. 
 143. Id at 192-93.  There was a Certificate, under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, that a point 
of law of general public importance was to be decided: “Whether in rape a defendant can properly 
be convicted notwithstanding that he in fact believed the woman consented if such belief was not 
based on reasonable grounds.”  Id. at 192. 
 144. As one commentator noted, “authors of law review articles cannot leave it alone.”  John 
H. Biebel, Note, I thought She Said Yes: Sexual Assault in England and America, 19 SUFFOLK 
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 153, 167 n.106 (1995). 
 145. Id. at 168.  A much earlier case, R. v. Flattery, (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 410, 414, supported this 
view. 
 146. Morgan, [1976] A.C. at 213-15.  The answer to the certified question was “No.”  See 
supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 147. For any given appeal of a criminal conviction that is considered by the House of Lords, 
only a few of the actual Law Lords decide the case. 
 148. See David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 329 n.67 (quoting 
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accord with common sense. . . . the law lords have been unduly 
legalistic.”149  The British public reacted to the Morgan decision with 
outrage.150  The controversy in Britain led to Parliament’s enactment of 
a new Sexual Offenses Act which made it clear that a rape would be 
committed in cases where a male may have been reckless as to whether 
the alleged victim consented to the intercourse.151  Mere intent on the 
defendant’s part would control no longer, the mens rea of recklessness 
would suffice. 
VIII.  THE DOCTRINE OF AFFIRMATIVE CONSENT 
Outrage, shock, disbelief, and mockery was the reaction to the case 
on the other end of the spectrum, the decision which highlighted the 
issue of affirmative consent, State in the Interest of M.T.S.152  The New 
Jersey Supreme Court made it clear in M.T.S. that its decision was 
influenced by, and directly responsive to, the goals of the rape reformers.  
The New Jersey legislature considered adoption of a criminal code in the 
early 1970s which would have been based on the Model Penal Code’s 
approach to rape laws, but in 1978 a new Code of Criminal Justice was 
enacted.153  The rape provisions of the code were formulated by the 
National Organization of Women (NOW) Task Force on Rape and other 
feminist groups.154  The bill was referred to in the legislature as the 
NOW bill, and it passed both houses of the New Jersey legislature and 
was signed into law by the Governor.155 
The NOW bill had been closely shaped by the Model Sex Offense 
Statute of the Philadelphia Center for Rape Concern.156  The Center was 
a lobbying group for feminists’ interests, and the stated intent of the 
Model Statute was to simply “remove all features [of past rape laws] 
found to be contrary to the interests of rape victims.”157  When the New 
Jersey Supreme Court determined that it was required to interpret what it 
deemed to be vague and crucial language contained in the statute, the 
Editorial, TIMES OF LONDON, May 5, 1975, at 15). 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Biebel, supra note 144, at 169-70. 
 151. See id. at 170; supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act, 1976, 24 & 25 Eliz., ch. 82, § 1 (Eng.). 
 152. State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 1992). 
 153. N.J. CODE OF CRIM. J. L. (1978); M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274. 
 154. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1274. 
 155. Id. at 1274-75. 
 156. Id. at 1275. 
 157. Id. (describing the intent of the Model Statute). 
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court was guided by the legislative intent and therefore the goals and 
interests of the NOW Task Force on Rape and the Philadelphia Center 
for Rape Concern.158  The Court expressed a consciousness that any 
definitional task “runs the risk of undermining the basic legislative intent 
to reformulate rape law.”159  To emphasize its desire to be supportive of 
the goal to reform the rape laws in the manner in which the backers of 
the reforms would have wanted, the Court cited the failure of the 
Michigan Supreme Court160 to adhere to the legislative intent reflected 
in the creation of Michigan’s groundbreaking rape reform legislation.161
M.T.S., a 17 year old boy,162 had been living at the house of C.G., a 
15 year old girl, for five days before the alleged rape occurred.163  
During three of those days, there had been “kissing and necking” and 
discussions of intercourse.164  Although some facts were in dispute, the 
trial court concluded—and the Supreme Court affirmed—that C.G. had 
consented to partake in a session of “kissing and heavy petting” with 
M.T.S. immediately prior to the intercourse.165  Penetration occurred 
without any threat of force and without any statement or action by C.G. 
that she did not want the intercourse.166  C.G. had clearly become upset 
after the penetration and the next morning she and her mother filed a 
complaint with the police.167 
The New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice defines the crime of 
sexual assault as penetration “us[ing] physical force or coercion . . . .”168  
Nowhere in the statute is there any elaboration on physical force.  
Although one could well maintain that the words are not ambiguous and 
should be applied in accordance with their plain meaning, the Court 
concluded to the contrary.  “Physical force” does not “evoke a single 
 158. The Court emphasized that its interpretation of the statute must fully comport “with the 
public policy sought to be effectuated by the Legislature.”  Id. at 1277. 
 159. Id. at 1275. 
 160. The Michigan case that was discussed by the M.T.S. Court was People v. Patterson, 410 
N.W.2d 733 (Mich. 1987).  M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1275. 
 161. See supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1975 Michigan statute.  
The M.T.S. decision clearly sympathizes with the dissent in the Michigan Patterson case which 
“soundly criticized the majority’s position as a distortion of the legislature’s intent . . . .”  M.T.S. 
609 A.2d at 1275. 
 162. Initials are commonly used in cases involving juveniles in order to protect the privacy of 
the youths. 
 163. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1268. 
 164. Id. at 1267-68. 
 165. Id. at 1267. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1268. 
 168. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(1) (West 2004). 
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meaning that is obvious and plain,” and therefore it became necessary 
for the Court to “pursue avenues of construction in order to ascertain the 
meaning of that statutory language.”169  And therein, the examination of 
the legislative history and the consideration of the wishes and goals of 
the feminist coalition that had proposed and supported adoption of the 
statute. 
The statute would seem to clearly contain two separate elements.  
First, there must be the sexual penetration, and second, there must have 
been the use of physical force.  The Court, however, concluded that to 
require physical force in addition to the act of unwanted penetration 
would be “fundamentally inconsistent with the legislative 
purpose . . . .”170  Were there to be penetration without the affirmative 
permission of the other individual, that penetration will be deemed to 
constitute the statutory requirement of physical force.171  “[P]hysical 
force in excess of that inherent in the act of sexual penetration is not 
required for such penetration to be unlawful.”172 
There was some, but little, concession by the court to interactions in 
the real world.  “Persons need not, of course, expressly announce their 
consent to engage in intercourse for there to be affirmative 
permission.”173  The Court concluded that the failure of the alleged 
victim to have protested or resisted was of no significance.174  In fact, a 
new shield was created: there is to be no inquiry permitted as to why the 
alleged victim did not resist or even protest the sexual penetration, and 
there is to be no inquiry as to what the actual desire of the alleged victim 
may have been.175 
The defendant, M.T.S., therefore, had committed the crime of 
sexual assault even though the penetration followed a period of bedroom 
kissing and heavy petting, and even though C.G. had never protested the 
initial penetration or resisted in any way.  The doctrine of Affirmative 
Consent had been established . . . by a unanimous decision of the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey.176 
 169. M.T.S., 609 A.2d at 1270. 
 170. Id. at 1276. 
 171. Id. at 1277. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. at 1279. 
 175. Id.  The inquiry is to be on the conduct or words of the alleged victim that would have led 
a reasonable person to have believed that there was affirmative and freely-given permission.  Id. 
 176. Id. at 1279-80.  A leading scholar on rape prosecutions has accepted the court’s decision 
in M.T.S. for his definition of consent which requires that “. . . at the time of the act of sexual 
penetration there are actual words or conduct indicating affirmative, freely given permission to the 
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The reaction to the M.T.S. decision was predictable.  Women’s 
groups, such as the National Organization of Women, applauded the 
court’s holding.177  The Public Policy Analyst for the Pennsylvania 
Coalition Against Rape, an organization that counsels rape crisis 
organizations, commented that “I haven’t heard of any other court 
decision that says ‘No’ will mean ‘No’ and that is simply enough.”178  
The defense attorney in the M.T.S. case, however, sarcastically 
suggested that as a result of the decision, “those who are dating should 
bring a ‘condom and a consent form’ with them.”179  The Chair of the 
Criminal Law Section of the New Jersey Trial Lawyers Association 
commented that the decision “sounds like you have to give a Miranda 
warning before you have sexual intercourse . . . .”180 
In addition to the judicially-imposed affirmative consent 
requirement in New Jersey, the states of Wisconsin181  and 
Washington182 have enacted legislation yielding the same result.  
Wisconsin’s Sexual Assault statute’s requirement that consent be 
illustrated by “words or overt actions” of the alleged victim, has been 
challenged on several grounds.  The first was that there was 
unconstitutional shift in the burden of proof to the defendant.  The 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals, however, rejected the claim in Gates v. 
State.183  The Court held that under the statute, the prosecutor continued 
to have the mandated burden and was “required to prove that the victim 
did not by either words or overt actions freely agree to have sexual 
contact or intercourse with the defendant.”184  A second challenge was 
made on the basis that it was fundamentally unfair and inappropriate to 
require that the defendant show that the victim had demonstrated 
affirmative consent in order for the intercourse to be deemed consensual 
and not rape.  The court in State v. Lederer185 responded to that claim: 
“Defendant contends that two parties may enter into consensual sexual 
act of sexual penetration.”  STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW 283 (1998). 
 177. Peggy O’Crowley, Date Rape Redefined: A New Jersey Supreme Court Ruling Will 
Change the Way Juries and Couples Look at Sexual Consent, N. JERSEY REC., Aug. 9, 1992, at 
A17. 
 178. Jerry Gray, Court Says Sexual Assault Can Occur Without Force, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
1992, at B5. 
 179. O’Crowley, supra note 177. 
 180. Id. (quoting D. William Subin). 
 181. See supra note 5. 
 182. See supra note 7. 
 183. Gates v. State, 283 N.W.2d 474, 477 (Wisc. App. 1979). 
 184. Id. at 478 (emphasis added). 
 185. State v. Lederer, 299 N.W. 2d 457 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1980). 
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relations without manifesting freely given consent through words or acts.  
We reject this contention as we know of no other means of 
communicating consent.”186 
The Washington State rape statute187 defining consent as requiring 
“actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have 
sexual intercourse,” was, however, silent as to where the burden lay as to 
the showing of consent.  The defendant in State v. Camara188 claimed 
that judge’s charge to the jury improperly inferred that the burden was 
upon him.  The Washington Supreme Court determined that there was 
“support in the history and purposes of rape law reform”189 to conclude 
that the intent of the legislature was to shift the burden of proof to the 
defense.190As a result of the Camara decision, Washington courts 
typically included the following instruction to juries in rape cases: 
A person is not guilty if the sexual intercourse is consensual.  
“Consent” means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse, there 
are actual words or conduct indicating a freely given agreement to 
have sexual intercourse.  The burden is on the defendant to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the sexual intercourse was 
consensual.191 
This instruction was challenged in 2006 in Washington v. 
Gregory.192  The defendant was not claiming that the judge’s instruction 
was wrong as to the current state of the law in Washington;193 the 
defendant conceded that the instruction did reflect the court’s holding in 
Camara.194  Gregory was seeking a reversal of the holding in Camara, 
but none was forthcoming: “We decline to overrule Camara, and 
conclude that the jury instructions here complied with due process.”195 
 186. Id. at 460. 
 187. See supra note 7. 
 188. State v. Camara, 781 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1989). 
 189. Id. at 639.  One commentator believed that the real motivation of the court was to show to 
the electorate that they are not “soft on crime,” and in so doing became hard on the constitution.  
David Hirsch, Presumption of Innocence NOT so clear in this State, SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 1991, 
at A9. 
 190. Camara, 781 P.2d at 486-87.  The concurring judge was even stronger and concluded that 
the “Legislature expressly intended to shift the burden of showing consent to the defendant. . . .”  Id. 
at 490 (Utter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  The judge’s two sentence concurrence offered no 
support whatsoever for his conclusion. 
 191. See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201, 1258 (Wash. 2006) (Sanders, J., concurring in 
result). 
 192. Id. at 1224-25 (majority opinion). 
 193. Id. at 1225. 
 194. See supra notes 188-190 and accompanying text. 
 195. Gregory, 147 P.3d at 1225.  But see the opinion of Judge Sanders in this case wherein the 
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Unlike the court decision in New Jersey and the legislative 
enactments in Wisconsin and Washington State which permitted 
affirmative actions as well as words to show consent, what occurred at 
Antioch College in Ohio as a response to two date rape incidents was 
more extreme.  The reformers in this instance were the Womyn of 
Antioch,196 and the “reform” achieved was that only verbal consent 
would suffice to show that the intercourse was consensual and not 
criminal.197  But, however clear the policy may have been as to what 
form of consent was mandated, it was vague and ambiguous in other 
respects.  “If the level of sexual intimacy increases during an 
interaction . . . the people involved need to express their clear verbal 
consent before moving to that new level.”198 
But sexual relations are not made up of distinct and discrete 
components so as to know when a new “level” has been reached and 
therefore the need for verbal consent.  And what is to be deemed sexual 
intimacy?  Is holding hands included?  Is stroking a partner’s hair a 
higher level than having one’s arms around the other’s body in a hug?  
The request to proceed must precede the sexual stimulation that often 
sets off the desire to continue.  The policy didn’t account for the truth 
that after some sexual touching there may very well be the desire for 
intercourse even though no such desire had existed earlier. 
But the greatest weakness of the policy was perhaps in its 
requirement that there be consent “each and every time there is sexual 
activity.”199  If the couple were living together and had relations every 
night upon undressing and going onto the bed, under the policy there 
must still be the series of verbal consents before any new level (whatever 
precisely that may be) is reached.  The parties’ prior sexual history and 
judge finds that placing the burden on the defendant “violates his most fundamental due process 
right . . . .”  Id. at 1266 (Sanders, J., concurring in result). 
 196. “Womyn” has been used by some feminsts to protest the masculine root of the word 
“women.”  See Corey Rayburn, Better Dead than Raped? The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital 
Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1121 n. 14 (2004) (noting that the use of “womyn” is an 
important symbol of breaking patriarchal linguistic patterns). 
 197. THE ANTIOCH COLLEGE SEXUAL OFFENSE PREVENTION POLICY (2006), available at 
http://www.antioch-college.edu/campus/SOPP (last visited Sept. 18, 2007). 
 198. Id.  The Policy made it clear that asking “‘Do you want to have sex with me?’ is not 
enough.  The request for consent must be specific to each act.”  Id. at ¶ 3 (1990).  In 1995, the 
Antioch College Sexual Offense Policy became known as Antioch College Sexual Offense 
Prevention Policy. 
 199. ANTIOCH COLLEGE SEXUAL OFFENSE PREVENTION POLICY, supra note 197, at 1-2 
(Clarifying Points). 
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their ongoing relationship do not relax the requirements laid out to 
prevent consensual sex from becoming rape.200 
The Antioch approach toward affirmative consent—the consent 
must be articulated verbally—has its supporters amongst modern day 
reformers targeting legislatures for changes in rape laws.  Indeed, the 
approach has its virtues—there are not likely to be mistakes arising from 
miscommunications—because of the clear need for the “yes, let’s go to 
the next level.”  A defendant who believed there was consent just 
because his live-in girl friend of two years got completely undressed, 
went on their bed and threw her arms wide open, will clearly be a sexual 
assaulter unless words of consent accompanied the girlfriend’s conduct.  
Coded, non-verbal communications such as tongue kissing won’t 
suffice. 
The Antioch reformers, as tends to be the case of most reformers, 
were not modest in their goals.  As the Preface to the Sexual Offense 
Prevention Policy, effective January 1, 2006, stated, the regulations are 
about “empowerment, changing our rape culture, and healing.”201  
Therefore, the policy applies not just to students but to “all . . . persons 
who use or visit the Antioch campus, regardless of their relationships to 
Antioch . . . .”202  The College had acted as a locality enacting its own 
rape laws where the actus reus of the offense did not have to be 
penetration but just any sexual contact or touching;203 there is, 
furthermore, formal and official notice given that “body movements and 
non-verbal responses such as moans are not consent.”204 
Any consideration of Affirmative Consent must examine the 
dynamic between that doctrine and the concept of mens rea.  Mens rea is 
a fundamental aspect of our criminal justice system; to be guilty of a 
crime one must have had a guilty mind when the act was done.  Unless 
one had the intention to cause the harm that resulted from one’s conduct, 
or the knowledge that is required by the statute (e.g., the crime of 
possession of stolen property requires knowledge that the property 
indeed had been stolen) a crime is not committed.  As Blackstone’s 
Commentaries elaborated on the classic Latin principle of mens rea, an 
“unwarrantable act, without a vicious will, is no crime at all.”205  The 
 200. Id. at 2. 
 201. Id. at 1. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 1-2. 
 204. Id. at 1 (emphasis added). 
 205. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at 758. 
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existence of knowledge, or intent, is an element of the crime that must 
be proven by the prosecutor to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Traditionally, for the commission of the crime of rape, an 
individual must have had knowledge that the other person was not 
consenting to the intercourse.  The actor must have had the intention to 
have had sexual relations with the woman even though the woman did 
not wish to engage in the sexual activity. 
But what if there is a legitimate mistake of fact?  What if the 
defendant in M.T.S.206 did think that after the kissing and petting in the 
bed that C.G. wanted to have intercourse?  That the intercourse was a 
natural progression from what was occurring?  That C.G.’s passion in 
the foreplay indicated she wanted more?  That, in M.T.S.’s experience, 
such heated bedtime involvement did lead to both parties desiring 
intercourse and nothing C.G. did or said that night indicated otherwise?  
Mistake of Fact in our criminal justice system has historically been 
recognized as a defense to a crime; mistake of fact can negate the 
existence of the statutory requirement of knowledge. 
IX.  “NO MEANS NO,” SEDUCTION, AND “MEN JUST DON’T GET IT” 
The Mistake of Fact defense in the context of rape, however, has 
been the target of the rape reformers.  The initial phrase used, “No 
Means No,” was a clear affirmation that there would be no valid excuse 
by an accused who proceeds with intercourse after the “No.”  It doesn’t 
matter how many Hollywood films the defendant may have seen where 
the initial “No” dissolved into a passionate kiss and ecstatic lovemaking 
followed by adoration and hugging in the morning.  It doesn’t matter 
what the accused’s experience had been in the past with women saying 
“No” when they really meant “Yes” because they wanted to convey the 
impression of Good, and certainly not loose, Girls.  It doesn’t matter if 
the man had read of the study of undergraduates in Texas207 which found 
that 68.5% of those females sampled reported that even though they had 
said “No,” what they meant was “Maybe.”208  Or if he knew that recent 
 206. See supra notes 152-175 and accompanying text (discussing the case). 
 207. Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say No When 
They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token Resistance to Sex, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872 (1988). 
 208. Id. at 874.  The students’ responses were based on the following hypothetical situation: 
“You were with a guy who wanted to engage in sexual intercourse and you wanted to also, but for 
some reason you indicated that you did not want to, although you had every intention to and were 
willing to engage in sexual intercourse.  In other words, you indicated ‘no’ and you meant ‘yes.’”  
Id. (emphasis in original). 
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studies have found very similar results as the Texas findings across the 
country.209  Or that one study found that 90% of sexually experienced 
women who had said “No” when they meant “Yes,” had stated that an 
important factor in their initial “No” had been the fear of appearing 
promiscuous.210  Or that some women undergraduates may even offer 
token resistance for “game playing” or “manipulative” reasons.211 
What about a “No” that’s given at 7 PM, but the evening activity of 
the date—cocktails, dinner, dancing, after-dinner liquor—has brought 
the couple closer together and, according to the man, the lovemaking 
flowed naturally and passionately at midnight.  Is he to be a rapist 
because of the 7 PM “No”?  Minds change about all kinds of things, 
one’s attitude toward sex certainly amongst them.  Some men are indeed 
successful suitors who have wowed and courted their date, and what had 
seemed terribly improbable at the beginning of the evening, may 
certainly change.212 
If force is used by the man to get a woman who had said “No” to 
change her mind, that is most certainly rape.  If the woman who said 
“No” physically resisted or protested or said “No” again as the defendant 
was attempting intercourse, that would be rape.  But if the man has 
charmed his date during the course of the evening, if all of his lines and 
routines worked, if the woman had become “smitten” and responded to 
the man in a manner in which a reasonable person would conclude 
indicated that she had changed her mind, then that earlier “No” should 
not cause the later intercourse to be deemed rape.  Surely it is whether or 
not the woman was consenting at the time of the intercourse that must 
control. 
Seduction is not rape.  Seduction implies that a reluctant partner, 
even one who had previously said “No,” had been lured to change her 
mind—voluntarily so.  Even regretting it in the morning and thinking 
“how did I ever allow that to happen,” does not transform the earlier 
seduction into rape.  Were the reformers to achieve a broader definition 
of rape so as to encompass situations where an initially reluctant 
individual consented to intercourse not due to forcible compulsion but 
due to the charm and appeal of a dating partner, our criminal justice 
system would not be well served.  A very rare instance where seduction 
 209. KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 35, at 260. 
 210. Id. at 362. 
 211. Muehlenhard & Hollabaugh, supra note 207, at 877-78. 
 212. But see Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 L. & PHIL. 127, 215 (1992) 
(maintaining that once a woman has said “No,” the man has been alerted to the lack of consent and 
strict liability should apply). 
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has been criminalized is the Model Penal Code’s deeming it a 
misdemeanor if a male induces a female to “participate [in the 
intercourse] by a promise of marriage which the actor does not mean to 
perform.”213 
The reactions by reformers to the refusal by some courts to accept 
that a “No” means “No” is certainly understandable.  And relatively 
recent cases where courts hold that “verbal protestations” are not 
sufficient to show that a rape was committed by the man who proceeds 
to intercourse immediately after the protests, do lead to unjust results.214  
It most certainly must be a woman’s choice to decide whether to engage 
in intercourse; concepts of autonomy and control over one’s body 
demand that such be the case.  But is it unreasonable to require that the 
man be made aware that the woman did not desire the intercourse even 
though the interaction between the two individuals would have led a 
reasonable man to think otherwise?  Should silence be viewed as a 
matter of law to mean “No”? 
Rape reformers often use the phrase, “men just don’t get it,” and 
hope that changes in rape laws can lead to societal and cultural changes 
in the interactions between the sexes.  Men must understand, it is 
maintained, that a woman may freeze immediately prior to intercourse 
and not be able to communicate any negativity and men must not take 
that silence as indicating consent.  That’s why an affirmative indication 
of consent is required; no assumptions ought be made.  If the law makes 
this clear to men, then men will act far more cautiously, respectfully, and 
judiciously.  The law must compensate for the failings of men.  As one 
feminist and rape reform advocate stated, “men are systematically 
conditioned not even to notice what women want.  They may have not a 
glimmer of women’s indifference or revulsion.”215  It was as though the 
mere presence of testosterone prohibited the ability of its possessor to be 
respectful of women’s concerns and interests and desires.  After all, 
“Men Are from Mars and Women Are from Venus.”216 
There is little doubt that alcohol use by either of the two individuals 
 213. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(d) (Official Draft 1962). 
 214. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 609 A.2d 1338 (Pa. Supr.Ct. 1992) (saying verbal 
protestations are not dispositive or sufficient evidence that a rape had been committed). 
 215. Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward a Feminist 
Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 653 (1983). 
 216. Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus was the title of a longtime bestselling book 
highlighting the different perspectives between the sexes.  JOHN GRAY, MEN ARE FROM MARS, 
WOMEN ARE FROM VENUS (Harper Collins 1992).  Over thirty-million copies of the book have 
been sold.  Marsvenus.com, http://www.MarsVenus.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2008). The book has 
been translated into forty languages.  Id. 
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can further enhance miscommunication.  Alcohol can lead to impulsive 
conduct, a loss of control and a misreading of the cues that are coming 
from the other person.  The use of alcohol by one or both parties in 
acquaintance rape cases may have great impact on juries.  Jurors might 
view the claim that the sex was non-consensual as having first arisen the 
next morning when the woman regretted both having gotten drunk and 
sleeping with the guy.  But that doesn’t mean that the woman had not 
been competent to, and didn’t choose to, consent to intercourse.  Jurors 
may also consider the level of intoxication in assessing the ability of the 
woman to fully remember what had occurred. 
X.  STRICT LIABILITY AND MISTAKE OF FACT 
Requiring affirmative consent clearly takes us beyond the “No 
Means No” mandate.  But should we go, as some reformers and courts 
have advocated, to a Strict Liability perspective on sexual relations?  
Under that theory, it matters not what the man thought as to whether 
there was consent, and it matters not what the woman may have done to 
have indicated to a reasonable person that she was consenting.  It will be 
rape as long as it is determined afterward that there was no consent.  An 
accused will be held strictly and completely accountable for his partner’s 
lack of consent. 
Consider the Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Simcock.217  
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that, “[e]ven a good faith belief on 
the part of the defendants that the alleged victim consented is not a 
defense.”218  If the jurors were to conclude that there was no consent, 
what the defendants knew or intended was of no import.  The judge 
emphasized to the jurors that “[t]he focus of the offense in rape is lack of 
consent on the part of the victim and not the subjective intent of the 
defendant while performing the act.”219  The Court ruled as it did in spite 
of its acknowledgement that “[t]he evidence, viewed as a whole, raised 
the issue of honest and reasonable mistake.”220  Three of the defendants 
testified that the alleged victim’s actions created the impression that she 
welcomed the sexual advances of the men.221 
‘The Simcock decision was expanded by the holding of the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 2001 in the matter of 
 217. Commonwealth v. Simcock, 575 N.E. 2d 1137 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). 
 218. Id. at 1140. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 1141. 
 221. Id. 
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Commonwealth v. Kenny Lopez.222  The defense had requested the trial 
judge to instruct the jurors that if a mistake as to the consent of the 
alleged victim was found to be a reasonable one, that would constitute a 
defense.223  Massachusetts judges had frequently given such an 
instruction as to a reasonable mistake of fact constituting a defense,224 
but the trial judge in Lopez did not.  The Lopez court agreed with the 
lower court and concluded that even a reasonable, honest perception on 
the part of the defendant as to the victim’s consent is not relevant in a 
rape prosecution.225  The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, in State of 
Maine v. Glenn Reed,226 similarly determined that the state of mind of 
the defendant is irrelevant as to a defendant’s guilt of a rape charge; rape 
“requires no culpable state of mind.”227 
Such “reforms’ in our rape laws go against the very core of our 
concept of criminal responsibility.  The Supreme Court in Morissette v. 
United States,228 over fifty years ago, observed that it was basic that a 
guilty mental state of mind accompany prohibited conduct.  “The 
contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by 
intention is no provincial or transient notion.”229  There are exceptions; 
strict liability offenses do exist for some minor crimes.  States 
commonly do not permit mistake of fact defenses for charges such as 
sale of alcohol to a minor.  Mistakes as to age are also not typically a 
defense to consensual statutory rape changes.230  But to incarcerate an 
individual to what may well prove to be life imprisonment when there 
has been no guilty state of mind has simply been unheard of in this 
country. 
Some go even further.  It’s rape not only when the perpetrator 
didn’t know there was no consent, it’s rape even though the “victim” 
 222. Commonwealth v. Kenny Lopez, 745 N.E. 2d 961 (Mass. 2001). 
 223. Id. at 963-64. 
 224. See Simcock, 575 N.E. 2d at 1141. 
 225. Lopez, 745 N.E. 2d at 966 (citing State in the Interest of M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266 (N.J. 
1992)). 
 226. State v. Glenn Reid, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984). 
 227. Id. at 1296. 
 228. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952). 
 229. Id. at 250. 
 230. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(1) (Official Draft 1962) (saying it is not a defense 
if a defendant either did not know the age of the victim or even reasonably believed the person to be 
older than ten); N.Y. PENAL CODE § 130.25 (saying no mens rea is required as to the actor’s 
knowledge of the age of the victim); WIS. STAT. § 948.02 (saying a Class B felony is committed 
whenever the victim is less than 13 years old, no mens rea required); Commonwealth v. Miller, 385 
Mass. 521, 525 (Mass. 1982) (saying a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction informing that a 
reasonable mistake as to the age of the victim is a defense). 
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didn’t know it.  “That a woman does not realize she has been raped does 
not, of course, mean that the rape has not occurred.”231  If one is at a loss 
to understand how the defendant can be held accountable for a crime that 
even the victim hadn’t perceived of as constituting improper conduct, 
two rape reformers explain that “the moral lessons taught by society 
make it difficult for many women to understand when they have been 
the victim of rape.”232  And in case one might assume that the fact that 
the victim proceeded on subsequent occasions to have intercourse with 
the defendant might constitute some evidence that no rape had taken 
place, that behavior could rather be explained as nothing more than the 
“victim’s need to normalize the situation.”233  Or, as another rape 
scholar maintained, by having consensual sex on a subsequent occasion 
with the rapist, the victim is merely attempting to regain control over her 
world.234  Such reasoning may well be used to support a reform that 
would preclude questioning the alleged rape victim about any attempts 
on her part to initiate further sexual relationship with the accused after 
the “rape,” because such evidence would not be deemed probative and 
would be highly and unfairly prejudicial—after all, the jurors might 
misinterpret the information and confusion might result.235 
XI.  RAPE TRAUMA SYNDROME AND THE EXPERT WITNESS 
One major reform effort in rape prosecutions has dealt directly with 
weaknesses in the prosecutor’s case arising from victim conduct which 
appears to be inconsistent with that of an individual who had just been 
sexually assaulted.  Prosecutors are often confronted with alleged 
victims who, after the rape, had not told anyone of the attack.  Not 
family, not friends, not police nor doctors.  Often the woman went about 
business as usual and mentioned nothing about being assaulted until 
many days had passed. 
The solution for reformers came in the form of 
 231. Little, supra note 20, at 1358 (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. (quoting MARTIN D. SCHWARTZ & WALTER DEKESEREDY, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON THE 
COLLEGE CAMPUS: THE ROLE OF MALE PEER SUPPORT 23 (1997)). 
 233. Id. 
 234. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON RECOGNIZING, 
FIGHTING AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 63-64 (1988), cited in Little, supra 
note 20, at 1358.  Warsaw’s comment reflects a survey by Ms. magazine which found that only 
twenty-seven percent of those who, as a matter of law, had been raped considered themselves to be 
actual rape victims. 
 235. See supra notes 57-65 for discussion of the justification provided for the enactment of 
rape shield legislation. 
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psychologists/psychiatrists236 who would testify at trial as experts on 
rape trauma syndrome.237  The testimony would, in substance, inform 
the jurors that they should not conclude that the alleged victim’s conduct 
after the rape was evidence that she had not been raped.  The victim may 
have feared mistreatment by the police and the courts, or a lack of 
sympathetic support from family.238  Some people who have been 
sexually attacked become traumatized, unable to discuss with anyone 
what had happened because they may have entered a state of denial.239  
Shame and guilt at what the woman might have done to provoke the 
attack may also play a role in the victim’s silence.  As one judge in 
Philadelphia noted, “[u]nlike the victims of any other crime, they [rape 
victims] are somehow suspected by society of being partially guilty; they 
are imagined to have contributed to the crime through some form of 
explicit or implicit seduction, or simply by not being as careful as they 
should have been.”240 
Rape trauma can be considered to be a form of Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, which the American Psychiatric Association recognizes 
to be a pattern of symptoms that develop after exposure to a certain 
uniquely stressful situation that is outside the common range of life’s 
 236. Until 1962, it was generally the rule that only doctors could testify as to the existence of 
any mental disorder.  In Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d.637, 643-44 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the court 
held that psychologists with the appropriate knowledge and experience could qualify as experts as 
well.  Experts in rape trauma can have a variety of titles, see, for example, Clark v. State, 654 So.2d 
984 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) where the testifying witness was an expert in “Forensic Psychology 
With a Specialty With Rape Victims.”  In at least one instance, a graduate student in psychology 
was qualified as an expert.  People v. Stanley, 681 P.2d 302, 305 (Cal. 1984).  But see State v. 
Willis, 888 P.2d 839, 845 (Kan. 1995) where the court held that rape trauma syndrome was a 
medical diagnosis and therefore a social worker would not be a qualified expert. 
 237. “Syndrome” is defined as “a group of signs and symptoms that occur together and 
characterize a particular abnormality.”  MIRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (9th ed. 
1988).  Perhaps the most commonly known syndrome is the battered woman syndrome that is used 
to support a claim of self defense in a murder or assault trial.  There’s been some attempt by war 
veterans to use post-traumatic stress to form the basis of a defense when charged with assault.  See 
Geraldine L. Brotherton, Note, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder—Opening Pandora’s Box?, 17 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 91 (1981-82). 
 238. See In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 428 A.2d 126, 143 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J., 
dissenting), superseded by statute, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5945.1, as recognized by Com v. Cody, 584 A.2d 
992 (Pa. 1991) (“Many victims do not even bother to report a rape because they feel the process 
they must go through in order to obtain a conviction may be as offensive as the crime.”). 
 239. To be sure, there is great variation in the ways that victims react to having been raped.  
The relationship, if any, that may have existed with the accused is crucial, as is family support, the 
victim’s personality traits and prior sexual history, the nature of the attack, and the overall coping 
abilities of the individual. 
 240. Commonwealth v. Gray, Nos. 748-678, Feb. 1980, as reported in Pittsburgh Action 
Against Rape, 428 A.2d at 139 (Larsen, J., dissenting). 
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experiences.241  The reaction to having been raped may occur in two 
distinct phases.  The first, the acute phase, may be characterized by a 
complete disruption of an individual’s life, including the numbing of 
emotional responses.242  The second phase may begin months after the 
rape occurred and entails the victim’s attempt at a long term resolution 
of the after-effects of the sexual assault.243 
To be sure, there was initial reluctance by the courts to permit such 
testimony.244  Expert testimony can generally only be admitted upon a 
showing that scientific or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to better understand the evidence, and that the testimony is 
reliable and based on sufficient facts or data.245  States “progressed” at 
varying speeds as to allowing expert testimony regarding rape trauma; 
some states enacted legislation, in others, judicial determinations 
occurred.  The first case that this author was able to uncover that dealt 
directly with the issue was the 1982 Kansas case of State v. Marks.246  
The state Supreme Court found the proposed expert testimony to be 
admissible and that rape trauma was a common reaction of one who has 
been sexually assaulted.247  The court found, furthermore, that such 
testimony would not improperly invade the province of the jury.248 
The California Supreme Court found otherwise.  In People v. 
Bledsoe,249 the court found that the medical purpose for recognizing the 
existence of the syndrome was to devise a tool to aid in therapy and 
treatment, and not for any determination of whether or not a rape had 
indeed occurred.250  The court held that “permitting a person in the role 
of an expert to suggest that because the complainant exhibits some of the 
 241. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS 247 (3d ed. 1987).  More specifically, rape trauma syndrome is the pattern of 
psychological symptoms that follow the sexual assault. 
 242. See, e.g., ANN WOLBERT BURGESS & LYNDA LYTLE HOLMSTROM, RAPE: VICTIM OF 
CRISES 37 (1974). 
 243. See Pamela Wilk, Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and 
Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 417 (1984). 
 244. The concept of rape trauma syndrome did not really exist until the mid-1970s when 
therapists who had been working with rape victims observed typical reactions by those who had 
been assaulted and designated those responses as rape trauma syndrome.  Id. at 417 n.3. 
 245. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 246. State v. Marks, 647 P.2d 1292 (Kan. 1982).  Although the California appellate court in 
People v. Matthews, 154 Cal. Rptr. 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) observed that the trial court had 
permitted rape trauma expert testimony, no issue concerning this was raised on appeal. 
 247. Marks, 647 P.2d at 1299. 
 248. Id. 
 249. People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291 (Cal. 1984). 
 250. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 300.  The court accepted the fact that rape trauma syndrome had, 
overall, reached a level of scientific reliability. 
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symptoms of rape trauma syndrome, the victim was therefore raped, 
unfairly prejudices the appellant by creating an aura of special reliability 
and trustworthiness.”251  The Washington Supreme Court in State v. 
Black,252 similarly concluded that such testimony would unfairly harm 
and prejudice a defendant and also determined that the concept of rape 
trauma syndrome had not been shown to be of sufficient scientific 
reliability.253 
Courts prohibiting such proposed expert testimony noted that the 
alleged victim could herself certainly testify as to the emotional trauma 
which she endured after the rape and explain that such trauma led to her 
failure to immediately report the incident to anyone.  Furthermore, lay, 
but not expert, witnesses, could be called to testify about the emotional 
state of the alleged victim.254  Nevertheless, courts started down the path 
of determining that the expert testimony was relevant and appropriate.255  
To be sure, there was an increasing acceptance by the psychiatric and 
scientific community of the concept of rape trauma syndrome.  So, for 
example, by the time that the Vermont Supreme Court considered the 
matter in State v. Kinney256 in the year 2000, the Court found that the 
rape trauma expert testimony was “professionally recognized as a type 
of post-traumatic stress disorder, and the behavioral characteristics of 
rape victims has been the subject of numerous professional studies.”257  
By 2004, the Colorado Court of Appeals was secure in noting that, “[i]t 
has been repeatedly held that rape trauma syndrome evidence is 
reasonably reliable[,]” and therefore admissible.258 
The expert, in most instances, would not have even interviewed or 
professionally evaluated the complainant, and the problems in permitting 
such expert testimony are several.  First, jurors might infer that an expert 
is being permitted to testify as to the manner in which rape victims act 
after they’ve been raped because the court has determined that such 
 251. Id. at 301 (quoting State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Minn. 1982)). 
 252. State v. Black, 745 P. 2d 12 (Wash. 1987). 
 253. Id. at 19. 
 254. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 301. 
 255. There was a similar development with the use of experts in battered women’s syndrome 
cases where the female defendant claimed to be acting in self defense.  Although the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983) held that the concept of 
the battered woman syndrome was not generally accepted in the scientific community, such expert 
testimony is used currently in virtually all jurisdictions. 
 256. State v. Kinney, 762 A.2d 833 (Vt. 2000).  Vermont’s Supreme Court had not previously 
ruled on the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence.  Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. People v. Baenziger, 97 P.3d 271, 275 (Colo. App. 2004) (emphasis added). 
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evidence is relevant in this case because the alleged victim had indeed 
been raped.  This very serious concern is typically dealt with by the trial 
judge’s instructions to the jury that the expert testimony was not to be 
considered as evidence that a rape had actually occurred in the case at 
hand.259  Any experienced trial lawyer will dispute the efficacy of such 
an instruction.  The jurors will make assumptions about the relevancy of 
the expert testimony, and the expert will have bolstered this 
complainant’s testimony that she was a victim of rape.  That’s the 
prosecutor’s goal in calling the expert to testify. 
A second problem with such expert testimony is the overt play to 
the emotions and passions of the jurors; the expert will describe the 
horrid impact on women who have been raped and how traumatized 
many become.  The expert can give accounts of the destroyed lives of 
clients that he or she has treated, and inform that many rape victims 
never recover from the assault.  Even though the expert is not permitted 
to say, “Jurors, I am an expert in dealing with the devastating aftermath 
of a rape and the traumatizing impact it can have, and my expertise 
enables me to tell you that this complainant was indeed raped,” the 
jurors may well conclude that such is the thrust of the testimony.260  And 
that is prejudicial.  And that prejudice is not countered, as the Vermont 
Supreme Court held it was, by the jurors’ knowledge that “[t]he expert 
never interviewed the victim and offered no opinion whether the victim 
suffered from rape trauma syndrome or exhibited any of the behavior of 
a rape victim.”261 
XII.  THE REQUIREMENTS OF A PROMPT COMPLAINT 
Another object of reform, and one that has met great success, were 
the laws requiring a prompt complaint by a woman who has claimed to 
have been raped.  The expectation that a raped woman will immediately 
tell others of the crime dates back to the 13th century judge and legal 
scholar Henry de Bracton’s instruction that such a victim “forthwith and 
whilst the act is fresh, she ought repair with hue and cry to the 
neighboring vills, and there display to honest men the injury done to her, 
 259. See, e.g., People v. Nelson, 22 A.D.3d 769, 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (saying any 
prejudice to the defendant will be dissipated by the court’s instruction to the jurors). 
 260. Experts are not to draw legal conclusions; such determinations are for the jurors or the 
judge to make. 
 261. Kinney, 762 A.2d at 843.  Instances where the expert would testify that the complainant’s 
responses were certainly consistent with women who had been raped, have been deemed error—
although perhaps, harmless.  See, e.g., People v. Coleman, 768 P.2d 32, 49 (Cal. 1989). 
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the blood and her dress stained with blood, and the tearing of her 
dress . . . .”262 
The Model Penal Code of 1962 was somewhat more forgiving, the 
complainant had up to three months to inform the authorities.  The 
Code’s concern was that any longer period of time would then be one 
which could include women who had consensual sex but subsequently 
discovered that they had become pregnant.  Such knowledge “might 
change a willing participant in the sex act into a vindictive complainant, 
as well as the sound reasoning that one who has, in fact, been subjected 
to an act of violence will not delay in bringing the offense to the 
attention of authorities.”263  The Commentary to the Code added that an 
objective, fixed period of time was required due to the “dangers of 
blackmail or psychopathy in the complainant.”264  As of 2004, only three 
states—California, Illinois and South Carolina—retained a requirement 
for a prompt complaint, and then only in the spousal abuse context.265 
XIII.  ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT’S PRIOR 
CRIMINAL RECORD 
It is a basic tenet of our criminal justice system that jurors are not to 
be informed of any prior criminal record of the defendant.  The rationale 
is that jurors must focus exclusively on the facts of the case on trial and 
determine whether each element of the crime charged has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Were the jurors in a robbery case to be told 
of the defendant’s prior robbery convictions, they might assume that if 
the defendant has done it before, he probably did it this time as well—
even though proof is lacking.  That is the reason that Federal Rule 
404(b) provides that, “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith.”266 
The one standard exception to the rule that jurors are not to be 
 262. HENRICI DE BRACTON, 2 DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGILAE 483 (Sir Travers 
Twiss trans., 1879), cited in Michelle Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, 
Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U.L. 
REV. 945, 947 n.5 (2004).  The “hue and cry” language was picked up by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court centuries later: “The lack of evidence of hue and cry that one might expect to ensue from rape 
casts doubt on the existence of the rape itself.”  Commonwealth v. Freeman, 441 A.2d 1327, 1332 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). 
 263. MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.4(23) cmt. at 265 (Official Draft 1962). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Anderson, supra note 262, at 964. 
 266. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).  Evidence of crimes or other bad acts may be admissible to show 
proof of preparation, plan, motive or opportunity.  Id. 
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informed of the defendant’s prior criminal record is when the defendant 
takes the stand to testify.  At such times, the defendant, as is the case 
with all witnesses, is subject to an attack on his credibility and prior bad 
acts are fair game.267  However, jurors in such instances are instructed 
by the court that they should not consider the prior crimes as in any way 
indicating that the defendant committed the crime for which he is on 
trial.  The past criminal record is only to be used as part of a 
consideration of the defendant’s credibility while on the witness stand.  
Pretrial hearings will often restrict the crimes which can be raised by the 
prosecutor at trial, and the more similar the prior crime is to the one on 
trial, the more likely it will be that no mention of the crime can occur in 
cross examination of the defendant because of its highly prejudicial 
nature. 
But a rape trial is different; there have been “reforms.”  Federal 
Rule of Evidence 413 provides that “[i]n a criminal case in which the 
defendant is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the 
defendant’s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault 
is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to 
which it is relevant.”268  The jury is to be informed of the defendant’s 
prior acts whether or not the defendant takes the stand. 
An analysis of the Congressional Record reveals the goals of the 
legislation.  First, there is an assumption that individuals who commit 
crimes of sexual assault are predisposed to repeat such acts, therefore, 
propensity evidence has a relevance unusual for other criminal cases.  
Secondly, there are the reasons generally provided as the rationale for 
enactment of changes in rape laws—victims are often not believed so 
additional forms of evidence may be needed to obtain a conviction,269 
victims will be more likely to come forth to prosecute if they believe that 
there is a greater likelihood of the conviction of the defendant. 
The import and need for such evidence at trial was highlighted by 
Congressional leaders.  Former Vice Presidential Candidate Robert 
Dole, Minority Leader of the Senate at the time, was direct when 
speaking of the need for the new rule: It’s an “entirely sound perception 
that evidence of this type is frequently of critical importance in 
establishing the guilt of a rapist or child molester, and that concealing it 
from the jury often carries a grave risk that such criminal will be turned 
 267. FED. R. EVID. 609. 
 268. FED. R. EVID. 413(a). 
 269. See Christina Wells & Erin Motley, Reinforcing the Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A 
Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 B.U.L. REV. 127, 140-41 (2001). 
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loose to claim other victims.”270  The “grave risk” is that the defendant’s 
trial may have all the safeguards that protect the accused throughout our 
justice system.  The “grave risk” is that the prosecutors would not be 
able to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt if they played by the 
regular rules, so permit them to utilize this prejudicial information that 
has always been prohibited in the past. 
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure had strenuously argued that this proposed revision to the 
Federal Rules of Evidence could “diminish significantly the protections 
that have safeguarded persons accused in criminal cases . . . against 
undue prejudice.”271  The Committee had received a report from the 
Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules which revealed strong 
opposition by the legal profession to the proposed revision of the Federal 
Rules.  The overwhelming majority of lawyers, judges, legal 
organizations and law professors on the Advisory Committee concluded 
that the rules would permit the admission at trial of unfairly prejudicial 
evidence.272  The Committee, therefore, recommended to Congress that 
the proposed revisions not be adopted.273  The revisions, the Committee 
determined, were neither based on nor supported by empirical 
evidence.274 
Federal Rule 413 was not restricted to prior criminal convictions or 
even arrests of the defendant, rather, any form of evidence of 
commission of a prior sexual offense would be admissible.  This could 
clearly lead to trials within trials whereby the prosecutor would call 
individuals who had claimed to have been attacked to the stand to 
present evidence about what happened on some former occasion, and the 
defendant would proceed to engage in a defense against these old 
charges.  Were Rule 413 to have permitted the admission only of prior 
convictions, that would have presented problems, but the admission of 
all forms of evidence opens the doors to a host of potential difficulties.  
Furthermore, the burden on the prosecutor to prove to the court that the 
prior offense occurred is not the traditional beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, but only proof by a preponderance of the evidence.275 
 270. 137 CONG. REC. 4927 (Apr. 24, 1991), cited in Wells & Motley, supra note 269, at 142 
n.60 (emphasis added). 
 271. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES ON THE ADMISSION OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
CASES, reprinted in 159 F.R.D. 51, 53 (1995). 
 272. FED. R. EVID. 413, 28 U.S.C.A., at III (Discussion). 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. 
 275. See, e.g., United States v. Enjady, 134 F.3d 1427, 1433 (10th Cir. 1998) (saying the 
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The dangers are twofold, at least.  Information about prior claims of 
sexual assault against the defendant may well prompt the jurors to 
desire, whether consciously or subconsciously, to convict the individual 
for his past uncharged crimes.  The defendant may be convicted for 
being a bad person, even when the current charges against the defendant 
were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  And there is no time limit 
imposed as to required proximity of the bad acts to the charged criminal 
conduct upon which the trial is based.  The jurors might just conclude 
that even though the current charges have not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, this is a bad guy who we do not wish to see on the 
streets. 
Congressional action, however, reflected the political forces of the 
day.  The coalition of women’s groups and the ‘get tough on crime’ 
adherents won out over the opposition of the legal profession.  The 
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, adding what 
was to be a new Federal Rule of Evidence 413, was passed. Another 
“reform” had occurred. 
The rationale behind rape shield laws is that prior conduct of the 
victim should have no impact on an assessment of what occurred as to 
the incident on trial.  But as to the defendant, evidence of prior conduct 
is to be allowed with the inference that “if he did it in the past, he did it 
this time as well.”276  Such a determination, one not based on fact or 
evidence, was exactly what rape shield laws were designed to, and do, 
guard against as to the alleged victim.  The accuser is protected, the 
accused is not. 
XIV.  THE ANONYMOUS VICTIM: PROTECTING THE IDENTITY OF THE 
ACCUSER 
Rape law reforms have led, as well, to changes relating to revealing 
the identity of the woman who is claiming to have been raped.  Our 
system of justice has required that the court process be an open one— 
trials are public.  Defendants as well as accusers are referred to by name.  
The only times, historically, that the public has been kept out of the 
courtroom is when an undercover police officer is testifying and there is 
district court is to make a preliminary determination that the jury could believe by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the prior offense did occur).  See generally Aviva Orenstein, Deviance, Due 
Process, and the False Promise of Federal Rule of Evidence 403, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1487 (2005). 
 276. One study found that there was a strong relationship between jurors’ knowledge of the 
prior criminal record of a defendant and conviction at a rape trial where consent is the issue.  Gary 
LaFree, et al., Jurors’ Responses to Victims’ Behavior and Legal Issues in Sexual Assault Trials, 32 
SOC. PROBS. 389 (1985). 
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7
KLEIN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:19 PM 
2008] AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM 1025 
 
a need to preserve the officer’s role as someone who is not known to be 
a police officer.  The only other instances when names have not been 
used is when juveniles are involved.  On occasion, the court, in a manner 
similar to the way a judge may impose a gag order on attorneys, may 
prohibit the media from disclosing any information which may identify 
the victim. 
To be sure, a defendant accused of rape is publicly so charged.  
Newspapers will headline the name of any well known celebrity or 
sports figure, and even if ultimately found to be innocent, the reputation 
of the accused may be forever tarnished.  But the media has been 
increasingly protective of the alleged victim; often such non-disclosure 
of the woman’s identity is self-imposed by the news sources.  A 
somewhat peculiar example of self-censorship is the policy of the 
Denver Post, the most highly regarded newspaper in Colorado, in the 
celebrated Kobe Bryant matter.277  After the prosecutor’s dismissal of 
the case against Bryant because the alleged victim had no longer wished 
to proceed, the civil case which had been filed three weeks before the 
dismissal continued in the federal court.  By that time, the accuser’s 
name had been widely reported in numerous websites and used any 
number of times in court.  Nevertheless, the Post continued to protect the 
somewhat discredited alleged victim.  The Post took what it deemed to 
be the high road: “Though her identity will be available to anyone who 
attends the federal trial or reads court documents, and many in the 
community know her name, it is not the same as [the Post’s] publishing 
her name . . . .”278 
An increasing number of states have enacted statutes prohibiting 
identification of a woman who is alleging that she has been raped.279  
The most common policy arguments presented in support of such 
legislation have been that the privacy of someone who has been sexually 
assaulted ought to be protected, and more women might report a rape to 
the authorities if they believed that their identity would be protected.  
Certainly, it is desirable to avoid additional humiliation to a woman who 
has been sexually assaulted.  Certainly, it is a legitimate state interest to 
encourage those who have been victimized to report the perpetrator to 
the police for arrest and prosecution.  And certainly, as internet use 
rapidly increases throughout the world, the potential exposure of anyone 
 277. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
 278. A Note to Our Readers, THE DENVER POST, Oct. 17, 2004, at A2. 
 279. See Daniel Murdock, A Compelling State Interest: Constructing a Statutory Framework 
for Protecting the Identity of Rape Victims, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1177 (2007). 
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involved in a trial to universal comment and critique has expanded 
exponentially. 
The non-disclosure statute in Florida, one of the first states to enact 
such a ban, provided that, “No person shall print, publish, or broadcast, 
or cause to allow to be printed, published, or broadcast, in any 
instrument of mass communication the name, address, or other 
identifying fact or information of the victim of any sexual 
offense . . . .”280  In spite of this prohibition, a newspaper did proceed to 
publish a rape victim’s name and was ultimately found to be civilly 
liable.281  The newspaper was ordered to pay $100,000 in punitive and 
compensatory damages to the rape victim whose name had been 
published.282  The Supreme Court, however, in Florida Star v. B.J.F.,283 
found the statute unconstitutional.  The primary focus of the Court’s 
holding was that the Florida Star had legally obtained from court records 
the victim’s name.284  An additional finding of the Court was that the 
statute was overly-broad in that it applied even in circumstances when 
the victim was already known to the community or when the victim 
herself sought the attention of the media.285 
Some states attempted to protect the alleged victim’s identification 
by enacting legislation which would ban the public, press included, from 
the courtroom in certain instances.  Massachusetts passed a statute 
excluding the public when a minor who has claimed to have been 
sexually assaulted is testifying.286  Once again, the Court in Globe 
Newspaper v. Superior Court287 found the state’s attempt to be 
unconstitutional.288  The Court emphasized the importance for the public 
to be able to exercise the constitutionally protected right to gain access 
 280. FLA. STAT. § 794.03 (1981). 
 281. An earlier Supreme Court case, Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), 
concerned a Georgia statute which criminalized publication of the name of an alleged victim in a 
sexual assault case.  The Court sided with the media, Cox Broadcasting, and emphasized the crucial 
role of the press in guaranteeing that trials be fair by public scrutiny of the judicial process.  Id. at 
492.  Punishing the media for disclosure could well encourage “timidity and self-censorship and 
very likely lead to suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and that should be 
made available to the public.”  Id. at 496. 
 282. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 529 (1989). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 538. 
 285. Id. at 539.  The Court made it clear that there may be some instances where a publication 
could be punished for publishing a rape victim name.  Id. at 541. 
 286. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 278, § 16A (West 2008). 
 287. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 288. Id. at 610. 
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to trials,289 one function of which is to “serve as a check upon the 
judicial process . . . .”290  Whereas the Court did note the compelling 
state interest in protecting juvenile victims, such interest did not excuse 
the compulsory courtroom closure.291 
Since in both Florida Star292 and Globe Newspaper,293 the Court 
emphasized that the victim’s identity had been revealed in the court 
records prior to publication causing the information to be readily 
available to the public, states responded by attempting to prevent the 
government itself from identifying the accuser in its official court and 
police records.294  As of 2007, eleven states have enacted laws295 which 
provide for non-disclosure of the victim’s name, but vary as to the other 
information that is similarly deemed to be protected.296  Some states go 
as far as to prohibit court papers from providing “details of the alleged 
offense” itself.297 
The major concern raised by keeping the victim anonymous is the 
damage done to the presumption of innocence.  If it is perceived that the 
victim’s name is not released so that she will be protected from further 
humiliation and victimization, there is an assumption that indeed she has 
been raped as claimed.  Those who bring false charges would not be 
deemed to be in need of such protections from public scrutiny; when an 
alleged victim’s name is not released, it will be assumed that is because 
she is indeed a victim.  She has been subjected to great harm, she has 
been violated, her identity needs to be kept secret, she has been raped. 
Some women’s advocates believe that laws prohibiting disclosure 
of alleged rape victims continues and perpetuates the concept that the 
victim is shamed, stigmatized and disgraced.  A former President of 
National Organization of Women concluded that prohibiting disclosure 
 289. Id. at 604. 
 290. Id. at 606. 
 291. Id. at 607. 
 292. Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). 
 293. Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). 
 294. Murdock, supra note 279, at 1186 n.99.  The Court had as early as 1979 in Smith v. Daily 
Mail, 443 U.S. 97 (1979), a case involving a newspaper which had published details about a 
juvenile defendant, determined that when “a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about 
a matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the 
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.”  Id. at 103. 
 295. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, Ohio, South 
Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming enacted such statutes.  Murdock, supra note 279, at 1186 n.99. 
 296. Id. at 1188. 
 297. See Murdock, supra note 279, at 1189 n.119 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.11 
(West 2007)); Murdock, supra note 279, at 1189 n.119 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-6-22 
(1988)). 
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“merely establishes [the victim] as an outcast . . . .”298  The feminist 
leader’s recommendation was to “Pull off the veil of shame.  Print the 
name.”299 
Like many issues in rape prosecutions, any non-disclosure of the 
victim’s name requires a balancing test.  One middle ground would be to 
let the alleged victim make the choice and only in instances where the 
woman clearly indicates that she does not want her name disclosed, 
would her identity be kept secret.  But such a compromise would still 
impact upon the First Amendment and freedom of the press; such a 
policy may still lead to perceived inequities when the defendant’s 
identity is plastered on the front pages of newspapers and his life torn 
apart as was the case with each of the three Duke University lacrosse 
players.300  And, such a policy could still negate the presumption of 
innocence for the defendant who claims that there was, in fact, no 
victim, and that the sex was consensual. 
XV.  PROHIBITING ADMISSIBILITY OF THE VICTIM’S CLOTHING AT THE 
TIME OF RAPE 
The reform of rape laws has led to prohibiting disclosure of more 
than just the prior sexual history or name of the alleged victim, many 
states now prohibit any mention to be made of the clothing that the 
complainant was wearing on the occasion where she and the defendant 
had been together before the intercourse occurred.  The Criminal 
Procedure Law of New York State is typical: “Evidence of the manner in 
which the victim was dressed at the time of the commission of an 
offense may not be admitted in a prosecution for any [rape] 
offense. . . .”301 
 298. Kevin O’Brien, South Carolina: Last Haven for Rape Victim Privacy?, 50 S.C. L. REV. 
873, 880 n.69 (1999) (citing Karen DeCrow, Stop Treating Victims as Pariahs; Print Names, USA 
TODAY, Apr. 4, 1990, at 8A). 
 299. Id. at 880 n.70. 
 300. Those claiming to have suffered from the now generally perceived to be false charges of 
rape include more than three dozen Duke Lacrosse Team Players.  A federal lawsuit against the 
University and the city of Durham claims that the players suffered emotional distress and invasion 
of their right to privacy because of the unqualified support of the prosecutor’s case and the negative 
treatment of the players.  Associated Press, North Carolina: Lacrosse Players Sue, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 22, 2008, at A17. 
 301. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.48 (Consol. 2007).  The statute does permit the admission of 
such evidence were a court to determine that the interests of justice so required.  See also 2004 La. 
Acts 676 § 4, art. 412.1 (prohibiting admission of the “manner and style” of the victim’s attire as 
evidence that the victim consented to or encouraged the intercourse); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-
15.1 (1997) (replaced by N.D. R. EVID. 412) (complainant’s dress was generally inadmissible unless 
the court finds the evidence to be material and highly probative). 
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The genesis of these laws can be traced back, in part, to the 
country’s shocked reaction to a jury verdict acquitting a man who was 
charged with a knife-point kidnapping and sexual assault in Ft. 
Lauderdale, Florida.  The victim in the case had been dressed in a very 
short, lace skirt, a tank top, and a leather belt; she was wearing no 
underwear.302  The defense offered these items into evidence at trial.  
The jury acquitted the defendant.303  Life would have gone on as usual 
had it not been for the presence of a member of the press in the 
courtroom, and the willingness of the jurors to explain their unanimous 
vote to acquit.304  “We all feel she asked for it for the way she was 
dressed,” said the jury foreman.305  “The way she was dressed with that 
skirt, you could see everything she had,” the foreman continued.306  
Then he added the kicker, “she was advertising for sex.”307  Another 
juror added, “she was obviously dressed for a good time.”308 
The verdict drew both national attention as well as outrage.309  A 
New York attorney with the National Organization of Women’s Legal 
Defense and Education Fund claimed that the case showed that “[i]n 
most rape trials, it’s the victim, not the suspect, who’s on trial.”310  The 
director of a Sexual Assault Treatment Center in Florida stated that the 
verdict could have a chilling effect on rape cases and discourage victims 
from coming forward.311  The fact that the defendant pled guilty two 
months afterward to having committed a rape in Georgia,312 just 
strengthened the perception that he had been guilty of the Florida rape 
but acquitted because the jury had blamed the victim. 
Reform was quick in coming.  The jurors’ claim that somehow the 
 302. Kevin Davis, Rape Verdict Delivers Outburst of Controversy, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-
SENTINEL, Oct. 6, 1989. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Cynthia Tucker, Glorifying the Use of Force Against Women Distorts True Nature of 
Rape, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 13, 1989. 
 306. Associated Press, Miniskirt Cited in Rape Acquittal, WICHITA EAGLE, Oct. 6, 1989. 
 307. Davis, supra note 302.  America is not the only country where such views prevail.  An 
Amnesty International survey in Britain found that 25% of Britons believe that if a woman is 
wearing provocative clothing, she is partly to blame for the rape, especially if she had been 
drinking.  Tom Parry, Shock Rape Survey: Asking for it, THE MIRROR, Nov. 21, 2005. 
 308. Tucker, supra note 305.  See also Donna Williams Lewis, Acquitted in Florida, He’s 
Guilty in Dekalb, Accused Admits Rape to Spare Georgia Victim, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 6, 
1989. 
 309. Bills That Passed, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 3, 1990. 
 310. Davis, supra note 302. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Lewis, supra note 308.  The defendant was sentenced to life in prison for the rape and 
received a 20-year concurrent sentence for the kidnapping of the victim of the rape.  Id. 
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victim had precipitated the rape provided the impetus for a reform that 
few had previously seriously considered.  Even though the jurors’ 
blaming-the-victim was nothing so unusual for those who have analyzed 
rape trials, the spectacle of defense counsel pointing in court to the 
clothes worn by the woman and implying, “What do you expect?” was 
horrifying.  Whereas jurors had in the past concluded that a woman who 
is out drinking at a bar and then goes to a man’s apartment at 3 AM may 
somehow have contributed to a defendant’s belief that there was to be 
consent for sex, the claim that “I knew she wanted sex by the way she 
was dressed,” was qualitatively different.  A woman’s right to 
autonomy, to freedom, certainly includes the right to choose what 
clothing to wear without fear that such decision may be interpreted to 
indicate that she is consenting to have intercourse.  It is totally 
inappropriate to conclude that just because the accuser was dressed in a 
certain way when she arrived at the defendant’s house that she wanted to 
have sex—her choice of clothing is by no means determinative of the 
issue.  The following bill passed the Florida legislature and was signed 
into law within nine months of the jury verdict: “[E]vidence presented 
for the purpose of showing that manner of dress of the victim at the time 
of the offense incited the sexual battery shall not be admitted into 
evidence. . . .”313 
XVI.  ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST WAVE OF REFORMS 
I will refer to the reforms discussed up to this point of the article as 
the First Wave of changes relating to rape prosecutions.  The reforms’ 
primary goals were to make it easier to convict individuals accused of 
rape and to encourage more women who had been sexually attacked to 
report the attack to the police and choose to fully participate in the 
subsequent court proceedings.  If a potential rapist believes that a 
possible victim is much more likely to prosecute under a system where 
she, and not he, would get legal protections and support, then perhaps 
the incidence of rape would be diminished.  If the potential rapist 
believes that there is a far greater likelihood that any rape he committed 
would lead to a conviction, one would expect a rather sharp downturn in 
the incidence of rape. 
However, analysis of the impact of these reforms has shown that 
the expected gains have not been achieved.  The most thorough 
examination, conducted by Cassia Spohn and Julie Horney, of the 
 313. FLA. STAT. § 794.022(3) (West 2008). 
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percentage of indictments that actually resulted in convictions found 
there to be no correlation between changes in rape laws and convictions 
in five of the six jurisdictions studied.314  In Detroit, unlike Washington, 
D.C., Atlanta, Chicago, Houston and Philadelphia, there may have been 
some discernible advances.315 
What are the most significant factors to be examining in assessing 
the impact of the reforms?  Does an increase in the number of rapes 
reported mean that more women feel freer to go to the authorities 
(showing a benefit from the rape reforms) or that there are actual 
increases in the occurrences of the rapes?  Should the amount of bail that 
is set upon initial arraignment be used to show that an accusation of rape 
is being treated more harshly if the bail is being set at higher levels than 
in the past? 
In 1993, Ronet Bachman and Raymond Paternoster attempted to 
assess results of the reforms beginning twenty years earlier.316  It was 
found, however, the law reforms had not significantly impacted either 
the reporting rates of victims or the responses to the reports by the 
criminal justice system.317  The one positive finding was that those who 
were ultimately convicted of rape were somewhat more likely to receive 
prison sentences than had previously been the case.318  One must bear in 
mind that harsher treatment of those accused of rape may just be 
reflective of the overall toughening of our sentencing laws.  The 
nationwide trend toward mandatory and harsher sentences has had an 
impact on rapist and non-rapist alike. 
After a thorough review and survey of the existing empirical 
studies of the impact of the rape reforms, two researchers concluded that 
“[t]here is growing evidence that . . . the legal reforms have generally 
had little or no effect on the outcomes of rape cases, or the proportions 
of rapists who are prosecuted and convicted.”319  And, significantly, the 
researchers conclude that the crime of rape continues to be 
underreported.320  A more recent report analyzing data emerging from 
 314. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND 
ITS IMPACT 160 (1992). 
 315. Id. 
 316. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape 
Law Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 554 (1993). 
 317. Id. at 573. 
 318. Id. at 574. 
 319. David Bryden & Sonya Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal Justice System, 87 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1199 (1997). 
 320. Id. at 1220-21. 
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statistical studies of the impact of rape reforms also concluded that there 
was no showing that the reforms have met the expected goals.321 
One comprehensive study of the impact of the groundbreaking 
Michigan rape reform statute which was enacted in 1975322 concluded 
that the reforms had not even led to subtle changes and that the 
“reformers had unrealistic expectations for the rape law reforms.”323  
The failure of the reforms in Michigan to have led to a higher incidence 
of reporting by rape victims is troubling.  The enactment of the statute 
was accompanied by a great amount of publicity which certainly 
attempted to make women aware of the protections—for example, 
prohibition of questions about prior sexual conduct—that they were now 
being afforded.  Women were informed that there was no longer any 
need to show that they had engaged in any form of physical resistance, 
and that no corroboration was required. 
The rape reforms were premised on the belief that more women 
would trust the police and prosecutors to support their claim and that 
changes in the evidentiary laws regarding rape would make it easier to 
obtain convictions.  The lack of increase in the percentage of those who 
have been raped who then report the rape is a strong indication of the 
failure, on one level, of the reforms.  But perhaps a more important 
question is, have the reforms led to an actual downturn in the 
commission of rapes?  Do potential rapists understand how the changes 
in the laws have certainly increased the likelihood of conviction for the 
commission of rape?  An extensive and comprehensive review of that 
very question concluded that there is no correlation between the extent 
of reform of the rape laws in a state and the numbers of rapes 
committed.324  The enactment of reforms has not diminished the 
frequency of sexual assaults.325 
XVII.  STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS LAWS FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE 
The Second Wave of reforms do not concern what actually occurs 
at the trial, but reflect continuing and recent attempts to change the laws 
to reflect a harsher treatment of the crime itself.  There have, for 
 321. Stacy Futter & Walter Mebane, Jr., The Effects of Rape Law Reform on Rape Case 
Processing, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 72, 111 (2001). 
 322. See supra note 59-60 and accompanying text. 
 323. Cassia Spohn & Julie Horney, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on the Processing of 
Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 861, 884 (1996). 
 324. Ronald Berger et al., The Impact of Rape Law Reform: An Aggregate Analysis of Police 
Reports and Arrests, 19 CRIM. JUSTICE REV. 1, 5, 19 (1994). 
 325. Id. 
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example, been radical, not just reformist, changes in the statute of 
limitations laws as applied to rapes. 
Statutes of limitations have been a fundamental aspect of our 
criminal justice system.  The general rule is that an individual cannot be 
prosecuted for a criminal act unless he has been arrested for the crime 
within a specified period of time from the date of the commission of the 
crime.  The most common time frames across the country are a two to 
three year period between the date of the crime and arrest for 
misdemeanors, and a five year period for felonies.326 
The primary function of the statutes are, as the Supreme Court 
noted in Toussie v. United States,327 to “protect individuals from having 
to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have 
become obscured by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of 
official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.”328  The New 
York Court of Appeals provided an additional justification of the 
statutes: the laws “encourage law enforcement officials promptly to 
investigate suspected criminal activity.”329  In the rape context, it would 
prove most difficult for an individual who is accused of a sexual assault 
many years after it allegedly occurred to be able to provide a full 
defense; witnesses, alibi testimony, or any records that might have been 
relevant may no longer be available.  And since corroboration is no 
longer required, a conviction could result from the unsubstantiated claim 
of the alleged victim that a rape had occurred in the distant past. 
New York, like many states, had an exception to the general five 
year statute of limitations for felonies.  Category “A” felonies, most 
notably murder and kidnapping, were the primary exceptions,330  a 
prosecution “for any other felony must be commenced within five years 
of the commission thereof.”331  Any other felony, that is, except – as of 
2006 – rape.332  A prosecution based on the occurrence of a rape, “may 
be commenced at any time.”333  Some states have not gone quite as far 
 326. Statutes of limitations are a standard part of our civil system as well.  Unless an individual 
files a claim within a specified period of time, he will lose the right to pursue the cause of action. 
 327. Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 328. Id. at 114-15. 
 329. People v. Seda, 93 N.Y.2d 307, 311 (N.Y. 1999). 
 330. N.Y CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(a) (Consol. 2008).  See also Vermont which has no 
statute of limitations for aggravated sexual assault.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4501(a) (2008). 
 331. N.Y CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.10(2)(b) (Consol. 2008). 
 332. The exceptions included other sexual abuse statutes of the New York Penal Law as well.  
2006 N.Y. Laws 3.  The law extended the time for the rape victim to commence a civil action based 
on sexual abuse from one to five years.  Id. 
 333. Id. (emphasis added).  See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-401 (West 2008) (stating there is 
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as New York.  Massachusetts, in 2006, instituted a fifteen year period 
for the defendant to be indicted for commission of rape,334  Pennsylvania 
has a twelve year limitation period 335 and Iowa has a ten year limitation 
period.336 
Whereas the state of Connecticut has eliminated a statute of 
limitation requirement as to a rape prosecution under certain 
circumstances,337 it is Georgia where the reform has led to perhaps the 
most puzzling result.  For most felonies, there is a four year period after 
the crime’s commission during which there must be an arrest or 
indictment, or else an individual cannot be charged.338  That period of 
time increases to seven years if the crime is such a severe one as to be 
punishable by death or life imprisonment.339  One would expect that a 
murder charge would, as is generally the case in most states, have the 
longest statute of limitations associated with it, but that’s not the case.  
For rape, the case a prosecution can commence for a fifteen year period 
after the commission of the crime.340 
There are a number of reasons that help explain the radical changes 
in the application of statutes of limitations to the crime of rape.  Firstly, 
the change is a reflection of the perception today that rape is a much 
more serious crime than had been thought in the past.  Connecticut 
Governor, M. Jodi Rell, presiding over a ceremonial bill-signing in 
2007, commented on the new law which would abolish any statute of 
limitations for rape in certain circumstances:341 
Make no mistake: Sexual assault is [a] violent crime – it is not a crime 
of passion. . . .  It is violence of the most personal and devastating 
kind, as brutal in its own right as murder.  And it deserves not only 
harsh punishment but our very best – and unswerving – effort to bring 
the perpetrators to justice.  Today Connecticut takes another step in 
that direction.342 
no statute of limitations for a rape charge), IND. CODE  § 35-41-4-2 (2008) (stating there is no statute 
of limitations for a rape charge if it constitutes a class A felony). 
 334. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 277 § 63 (2008). 
 335. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5552 (2007). 
 336. IOWA CODE § 802.2 2007). 
 337. See supra note 10. 
 338. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1 (2007). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. See supra note 10. 
 342. Press Release, The Office of Governor M. Jodi Rell, Governor Rell Highlights New Law 
Eliminating Statute of Limitations in Rape Cases with DNA Evidence (Aug. 21, 2007), available at 
http://www.ct.gov/governorrell/cwp/view.asp?A=2791&Q=391712 (emphasis added). 
54
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7
KLEIN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:19 PM 
2008] AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM 1035 
 
The rape reformers’ focus on the traumatizing impact of a sexual 
assault on the victim has led to the realization that the victim, at times, is 
not able to discuss the incident until many years have passed.  Statutes of 
limitations had the effect of precluding any prosecution of an accused if 
the set number of years had transpired before the victim was able to 
come forward.  Another factor weighing against the traditional time 
period is that there have been recent instances of “recovered memory,” 
where therapy or hypnosis has enabled a victim many years after the 
rape to remember what exactly occurred that was so traumatic. 
But, for some states at least, the advances in DNA testing which 
could enable fairly certain identification many years afterwards of the 
individual who committed the rape, have been most significant.343  The 
traditional weakness in testimonial evidences as it ages and memories 
fade and witnesses disappear, are compensated for by the near-certainty 
of DNA identification.  In rape cases where consent is not the issue, but 
rather identification of the attacker is, indictments have been issued in 
the name of “John Doe, unknown male,” in instances when DNA tests 
have been possible from evidence recorded from the scene of the crime 
and the attacker was not apprehended.344  The expectation is that that 
such a timely indictment satisfies the requirement of the statute of 
limitations, and if subsequently there is a DNA match that comes up 
from some jurisdiction’s databank, the suspect’s name can be substituted 
for “John Doe” and the prosecution will proceed.345 
Many states do not require such an indictment in order to prosecute 
an individual for an unlimited period of time after the occurrence of the 
rape.  Oklahoma, for instance, while having a general statute of 
limitations for rape of twelve years,346 permits a prosecution to 
commence at anytime if there has been a DNA profile obtained from 
physical evidence.347  And Georgia’s fifteen year statute of limitations 
 343. Governor Rell of Connecticut, when signing the bill eliminating Connecticut’s statute of 
limitations for rape, emphasized the import of DNA technology in identification of rape suspects.  
See id. 
 344. See, e.g., Steve Chapman, Rapists Shouldn’t Be Able to Run Out the Clock, CHI. TRIB., 
Mar. 12, 2000, at C19. 
 345. In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the District Attorney, shortly before the six year statute of 
limitations was due to expire, charged “John Doe” with the rape based on DNA markers.  The D.A. 
commented that, “[s]omeday, somewhere, we hope this guy comes up in somebody’s databank. . . .  
And we’ll nail him.”  Id. 
 346. 22 OKLA. STAT.22,  § 152(C)(1) (2007) 
 347. § 152(C)(2)(b). 
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for rape348 does not apply if DNA evidence is recovered; after that 
period, the prosecution can be commenced at anytime.349 
XVIII.  SEXUAL REGISTRY LAWS AND RESTRICTIONS ON LIBERTY 
Heightened scrutiny of those who have been convicted of rape in 
recent years has led to a belief that those charged with sexual assault are 
likely to commit another such crime after they are released from 
custody.  Reforms that have occurred in response to this perception had 
taken two different paths.  The first reform has been the creation of 
sexual registry laws. 
Congress, in response to a horrifying crime, enacted the Jacob 
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Registration Act in 1994.350  The Act created a national Registry 
requiring all states and municipalities to submit data to the Registry; 
failure to comply would lead to a 10% reduction in federal funding 
allocated under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.351  
The Act succeeded in its goal: every state has created a sex offender 
registration program.352 
The Jacob Wetterling Act has been amended five times since its 
enactment,353 most importantly, the 1996 amendment commonly 
referred to as Megan’s Law.354  The effect of that law was highly 
significant, it provided for public dissemination of the names of those 
who had registered.  Megan’s Law was followed by the Pam Lynchner 
Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996,355 the Jacob 
 348. GA. CODE ANN. § 17-3-1 (2007). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994), repealed by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901(1) (2006).  Jacob Wetterling was an 11 year old who was believed to have 
been abducted in 1989 by released sex offenders in Minnesota.  Steven Costigliacci, Note: 
Protecting Our Children From Sex Offenders:  Have We Gone Too Far?  46 FAM.CT REV 180, 182-
83 (2008).  The high degree of publicity concerning the crime led Minnesota to create a state 
registry to contain the names of released sex offenders.  Id. 
 351. Id.  The Omnibus Crime Control Act 42 U.S.C. § 3758 (2006) disbursed $1.09 billion to 
the states in 2006; $2.7 million was the minimum allocated to any one state.  Costigliacci, supra  
note 350, at 182. 
 352. See State Statutory Surveys Sex Offender Registration (West 2007). 
 353. Costigliacci, supra note 351, at 181. 
 354. Megan’s Law, Pub. L. No. 104-145, 110 Stat. 1345 (1996). 
 355. Pam Lychner Sex Offender Tracking and Identification Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-236, 
110 Stat. 3093 (1996). 
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Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997,356 Jennifer’s Law,357 and the 
Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.358  Finally, 
in 2006, the Jacob Wetterling Act was repealed by Congress and 
replaced with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006.359 
As is often the case, the federal legislation prompted states to 
expand upon what Congress has enacted.  As of 2007, 22 states and 
hundreds of municipalities have passed laws prohibiting those convicted 
of sexual offenses from living near schools, playgrounds, parks, or day 
care centers.360  One major problem with these reforms is that there 
simply is not any evidence available to support these residential 
restrictions.  There is no research of any sort that has substantiated a 
claim that living in close proximity361 to the specified locations increases 
the likelihood of sexually recidivating.  The Medical Director of the 
New York State Psychiatric Institute has commented on an additional 
concern: “When there’s a great degree of restrictions on sex offenders, it 
becomes almost impossible for them to find an acceptable neighborhood, 
and they wind up being homeless and then even harder for us to 
track.”362 
There is certainly no empirical research that has demonstrated that 
residential restrictions provide a viable strategy for reducing sexual 
assaults.363  Nevertheless, there is widespread popular support for these 
laws.  In California, for example, a referendum prohibiting sex offenders 
from living within 2000 feet of a park or school had overwhelming 
support from voters.364  To be sure, there is the perception of the public 
 356. Jacob Wetterling Improvements Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2461-
71  (1997). 
 357. Jennifer’s Law, 42 U.S.C. § 14661 (2000). 
 358. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-36, 114 
Stat. 1464, 1537-1539 (2000). 
 359. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42 U.S.C. § 16901(1) (2006). 
 360. See Jill Levenson et al., Sex Offender Residence Restrictions: Sensible Crime Policy or 
Flawed Logic?, FED. PROBATION 2, 2 (2007). 
 361. It is common for jurisdictions to define a 1000-2500 distance as being in close proximity.  
Id. 
 362. I, New York, TIME OUT NEW YORK, Feb. 28-Mar. 4, 2008, at 6 (quoting Richard Krueger, 
M.D., medical director of the Sexual Behavior Clinic at the New York State Psychiatric Institute), 
available at http://www.timeout.com/newyork/articles/i-new-york/26921/sex-offenders.  There are, 
as of February 2008, over 26,000 registered sex offenders in New York State, including 5,700 in 
New York City.  Id. 
 363. Levenson et al., supra note 360, at 2. 
 364. Id. 
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that a high percentage of sexual offenders are likely to commit such 
crimes in the future. 
That is a perception shared by lawmakers as well.  The legislative 
purpose behind the passage of the New York State Sexual Offender 
Registration Act clearly identifies the concern: 
The legislature finds that the danger of recidivism posed by sex 
offenders . . . and that the protection of the public from these offenders 
is of paramount concern or interest to government.  The legislature 
further finds that law enforcement agencies’ efforts to protect their 
communities, conduct investigations and quickly apprehend sex 
offenders are impaired by the lack of information about sex offenders 
who live within their jurisdiction and that the lack of information 
shared with the public may result in the failure of the criminal justice 
system to identify, investigate, apprehend and prosecute sex 
offenders.365 
The opening sentence of this statute certainly hints at the greater 
incidence of recidivism by sex offenders than by those convicted of 
other crimes.  Not only is there lack of empirical support for such a 
claim,366 but a study by the U.S. Department of Justice in 2002 actually 
found much higher rates of recidivism for larceny (75%), burglary 
(74%), auto theft (79%), and driving while intoxicated (52%).367 
It is the desire by state authorities to watch over and regulate ex-sex 
offenders that raises serious concerns.  If the registration and regulation 
is a form of punishment of the sex offender, the prohibition against 
double jeopardy would be violated.  The Double Jeopardy Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution provides: “[N]or shall any person be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. . . .”368  The 
Supreme Court, in Benton v. Maryland,369 ruled that the Clause was 
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.370  The Supreme Court, in Witte v. United States,371 
interpreted the ban to prevent the government from “punishing twice, or 
attempting a second time to punish criminally, for the same offense”372  
 365. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (Consol. 2008). 
 366. See Levenson et al., supra note 360 . 
 367. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM 
OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002). 
 368. U.S. CONST. AMEND. V. 
 369. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.784 (1969). 
 370. Id. at 787. 
 371. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S 389 (1995). 
 372. Id. at 396 (emphasis omitted). 
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The individual served his time and no additional punishment can be 
inflicted upon his departure from prison.  States get around this most 
serious problem by insisting that the defendant is not being punished by 
having to register, or by being told that he is not permitted to live in 
certain areas.  The state is merely engaging in regulation of ex-cons.  
And those ex-cons have no reason to expect to have the same rights as 
others.  The New York State Legislative Findings regarding the rational 
for the Sex Offender Registry statute continued: 
Persons found to have committed a sex offense have a reduced 
expectation of privacy because of the public’s interest in safety and in 
the effective operation of government.  In balancing offenders due 
process and other rights, and the interests of public security, the 
legislature finds that releasing information about sex offenders to law 
enforcement agencies and, under certain circumstances, providing 
access to limited information about certain sex offenders to the general 
public, will further the primary government interest of protecting 
vulnerable populations and in some instances the public, from potential 
harm.373 
It is difficult to maintain that causing the ex-sex offender to “wear a 
Scarlet Letter”374 identifying himself as “Sex Offender” is going to 
prompt an easy reintegration of that person into the community.  
Landlords have ready access to sex registry records and often will refuse 
to rent to a sex offender.  The antagonism of many toward living near an 
ex-offender can be illustrated by residents in Connecticut who petitioned 
the local tax assessors to lower their local property taxes because of the 
reduction in the value of their homes brought about by an ex-sex 
offender moving into their neighborhood.375  The community 
notification and public dissemination provisions, which publicize where 
an offender lives and information about his crime, have led to 
widespread labeling, ostracizing, and attacks on the ex-offender.376  
 373. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 (Consol. 2008). 
 374. See NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).  Nathaniel Hawthorne wrote 
the novel, The Scarlet Letter, in 1850 and describes a situation in Boston in the Seventeenth Century 
wherein a woman must wear the scarlet letter “A” on her chest to indicate to all that she had 
committed adultery.  See id. 
 375. Corey Kilgannon, Woman With a Mission, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2008, at B5. 
 376. Id.  In areas where there is no active dissemination of information by the police about the 
residences of ex-offenders, groups of citizens may take on that function.  An organization in Suffolk 
County, New York, Parents for Megan’s Law and the Crime Victims’ Center, compiles detailed 
data about sex offenders and distributes the information to neighbors.  Id.  Updates such as a change 
in automobile used by the offender are provided regularly.  The organization received in March, 
2008 a $593,000 federal grant to administer the program on a national level.  Id. 
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When this is coupled with the financial instability that results from 
employer reluctance to hire such an individual, re-entry into society 
becomes difficult indeed.  Even if the offender does not reveal his past, 
many employers check with local registries to see if the potential 
employee has been registered as a prior sex offender.  If rape is, as many 
feminists believe that it is, an act of violence prompted by aggression, 
anger, and hatred, then isolating and stigmatizing the ex-offender may 
well prove to create bitterness and resentment and be counterproductive. 
XIX.  CIVIL COMMITMENT OF THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AFTER RELEASE 
FROM PRISON 
Another post-rape-conviction reform is the enactment of statutes 
aimed at prohibiting the freedom of a rapist after the prison sentence has 
been completed.  The same double jeopardy claim exists —an individual 
cannot be subjected to additional punishment once the originally-
imposed sentence is completed.  Although an individual may well regard 
being denied his freedom because he has been civilly committed to a 
mental institution as a punishment, statutes providing for such 
commitment claim to be for the purpose of rehabilitation or for the 
protection of the society at large.  Statutes for commitment of sex 
offenders are designed to apply when no mental disease or defect can be 
shown, and therefore the more traditional involuntary commitment 
statute would not apply. 
Although civil detainment statutes can be traced back to a 1937 
Michigan law,377 the real impetus for the recent enactments has been the 
ongoing rape reform movement.  The early statutes, often referred to as 
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender statutes, provided for civil 
confinement of sexual psychopaths and deviants based on a finding that 
a particular individual would be likely to commit a sexual offense as a 
result of his mental disease or defect.378  These statutes applied even 
when the individual had not actually committed a crime or had been 
incarcerated prior to such commitment. 
These first sets of statutes providing for civil commitment of sex 
offenders hit a major roadblock when the Supreme Court decided 
 377.  See John Fabian, Examining Our Approaches to Sex Offenders & the Law:  Kansas v. 
Hendricks, Crane and Beyond: “Mental Abnormality” and “Sexual Dangerousness”:  Volitional vs. 
Emotional Abnormality and the Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2003). 
 378. Id. 
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Baxstrom v. Herold, State Hospital Director,379 and Specht v. 
Patterson.380  In Baxstrom, the Court reviewed a New York State statute 
authorizing prisoners to be committed to a state mental hospital at the 
expiration of their prison sentences.  The statute was similar to the 
Mentally Disordered Sex Offender laws, except that it applied to 
individuals who had been incarcerated for any, not just a sex, offense. 
The Court’s unanimous decision invalidated the statute because 
there was no jury review of the decision to civilly commit the 
prisoner.381  The Court also held that the equal protection rights of the 
individual had been denied.  The Court reasoned that since he had not 
been incarcerated at the time the decision was made that he was to be 
civilly committed, he should have been entitled to a full hearing as to the 
issue regarding his alleged status as a dangerously mentally ill 
individual.382  The petitioner in Specht had been convicted of a sex 
offense and, in accordance with the Colorado Sex Offenders Act,383 was 
to be civilly committed to a state hospital for an indeterminate period 
which may have been for the remainder of his life.384 
The Court dealt directly with the claim that the procedures for 
committing a convicted sex offender to a state mental hospital were civil 
in nature and therefore neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment were applicable.385  The 
Court held that even though the claimed purpose for the civil 
commitment was not designated as retribution, but rather to keep 
individuals from engaging in future harm, it was, in fact, criminal 
punishment.386  The statute had led to a violation of due process because 
there was no provision for counsel for the individual nor the opportunity 
to present evidence on his own behalf prior to being civilly 
committed.387 
The civil commitment for sex offender statutes had clearly received 
a setback, as the designation of such commitment as a civil or as a 
criminal matter was crucial.  However, the impact of the reformers of the 
1970s and 1980s, and the change in the society’s view of rape, altered 
the court’s perspective on civil commitment.  In 1986, the Supreme 
 379. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
 380. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). 
 381. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110. 
 382. Id. at 110, 115. 
 383. Specht, 386 U.S. at 607 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 39-19-1 to 10 (West 1963)). 
 384. Specht, 386 U.S. at 607. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. at 608-09. 
 387. Id. 
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Court took a large step back from the Baxstrom and Specht decisions of 
the 1960s.388  In Allen v. Illinois,389 the Court was confronted with a 
situation wherein the sexual assault charges against the defendant had 
been dismissed by the trial court after a preliminary hearing, finding that 
there was a lack of probable cause to conclude that the defendant had 
committed the assault.390  The state then embarked, in what it claimed to 
be a civil proceeding, to have the accused deemed to be a “sexually 
dangerous person” and thereby committed to a maximum security 
mental institution.391 
The accused’s claim was that the proceeding which found him to be 
dangerous was in reality a criminal one and therefore one at which he 
should have been afforded all of his constitutional protections.392  The 
accused claimed than the mere fact that the Illinois Sexually Dangerous 
Persons Act designated proceedings covered by the Act to be civil and 
not criminal should not be dispositive.393  Indeed, the Court had decided 
just six years prior to Allen, in United States v. Ward,394 that if such a 
process is “punitive in  either purpose or effect” it can negate any 
intention by the state to have the matter deemed civil and must be 
considered criminal with accompanying privileges and protections.395  
The Court in Allen, however, in a 5-4 decision, concluded that 
proceedings for civil commitment under the Act were to be considered 
civil and not criminal and, therefore, the Due Process Clause was not 
applicable.396  The state’s purpose in committing an individual under the 
Act was not punitive, but rather therapeutic for the individual and 
protective of the safety of other citizens of the state.397 
But it was the 5-4 decision of the Supreme Court in Kansas v. 
Hendricks398 that has most directly endorsed the reform of civilly 
committing an individual immediately upon conclusion of his prison 
sentence.  Hendricks was the first individual that Kansas had attempted 
to cover under its Sexually Violent Predator Act.399  The Act was 
 388. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 389. Id. at 366. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. at 368. 
 392. Id. 
 393. Id. at 367-68. 
 394. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980). 
 395. Id. at 251. 
 396. Allen, 106 S.Ct. at 375. 
 397. Id. at 373. 
 398. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S 346 (1997). 
 399. Id. at 350. 
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designed to commit those who do not have a mental disease or defect, so 
a traditional civil commitment statute would not apply.400  The state 
legislature had determined that commitment was required because 
“sexually violent predators’ likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of 
predatory sexual violence is high.”401  No empirical evidence nor any 
research studies, were referenced for this conclusion.  The fifty-nine year 
old Hendricks was not exempted from the generalization about sexual 
offenders.  The Act provided for an indefinite commitment because “the 
treatment needs of this population are very long term and the treatment 
modalities for this population are very different than the traditional 
treatment modalities for people appropriate for commitment under the 
[general involuntary commitment statute].”402 
Hendricks maintained that such confinement was most assuredly 
punishment and that proceedings under the Act were, therefore, criminal 
in nature.403  Hendricks argued that he had served his full ten year prison 
sentence, and such additional loss of liberty constituted double 
jeopardy.404  And the loss of liberty could be for the remainder of his 
life.  Justice Clarence Thomas, writing for the Court, concluded that the 
Act was “civil in nature” and therefore the “initiation of its commitment 
proceedings does not constitute a second prosecution.”405  And whatever 
Hendricks may think to the contrary notwithstanding, “involuntary 
confinement pursuant to the Act is not punitive.”406  The ex post facto 
claim was similarly dismissed; there was no new punishment for an act 
previously committed because confinement under the Act does not 
constitute punishment.407  Even confinement for life.  Even confinement 
in, as was the case, a unit that was physically within the prison 
system.408 
Even though the Kansas Sexual Violent Predator statute had been 
upheld by the narrowest of margins, many jurisdictions proceeded to 
 400. Id. at 350-51. 
 401. Id. at 351. 
 402. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a 01 (West 1994). 
 403. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
 404. Id. 
 405. Id. at 369. 
 406. Id. at 368 (emphasis added). 
 407. Id. at 370.  The four dissenters strongly disagreed.  The Act, Justice Breyer wrote, “was 
not simply an effort to commit Hendricks civilly, but rather an effort to inflict further punishment 
upon him.”  Id. at 373 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 408. Id. at 368. 
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pass similar laws.409  By early 2007, nineteen states had enacted civil 
commitment programs for sexual offenders; a special report for the New 
York Times deemed such confinement to be “a growing national 
movement.”410  New York became the twentieth state as the then newly-
elected Governor Eliot Spitzer signed, with a great deal of ceremony, the 
first major piece of legislation of his short-lived administration—a civil 
commitment for sexual offenders bill.411  Congressional legislation, 
signed by President Bush, provides money to states that civilly commit 
sex offenders after the prison term has been served.412  Conditions in the 
civil commitment facilities have been found to “look and feel like 
prisons, with clanking double doors, guard stations, fluorescent lighting, 
cinder-block walls, overcrowded conditions and tall fences with razor 
wire. . . .”413 
But it should not be assumed that such prison-like conditions 
constitutes punishment.  The Supreme Court in Mark Seling, 
Superintendent, Special Commitment Center, Petitioner v. Andre 
Brigham Young,414 considered such a claim.  The state of Washington 
enacted a statute, the Sexually Violent Predators Act,415 virtually 
identical to the Kansas law considered in Hendricks.416  Young’s claim 
was that, as applied to him, the statute was punitive and therefore 
violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause.417  It was not a frivolous 
claim—a court-appointed psychologist assigned to write a report on 
conditions in the Washington Commitment Center did conclude that “the 
Center was designed and managed to punish and confine individuals for 
life without any hope of release to a less restrictive setting.”418  The 
Center was located within a larger prison operated by the Department of 
Corrections (DOC) and the DOC was actively involved in the 
management of the Center.419 
The Ninth Circuit concluded in Young v. Weston420 that 
 409. Grant Morris, Mental Disorder and the Civil/Criminal Distinction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
1177, 1190 (2004). 
 410. Monica Davey & Abby Goodnough, Doubts Rise as States Hold Sex Offenders After 
Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007. 
 411. Wrong Turn on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at A18. 
 412. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 410. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001). 
 415. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.060 (LexisNexis 2008). 
 416. Seling, 531 U.S. at 259-60. 
 417. Id. at 258 
 418. Id. at 260 (emphasis added). 
 419. Id. 
 420. Young v. Weston, 192 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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Hendricks421 had not precluded a challenge to the statute as applied to a 
particular individual.422  The actual conditions of confinement could 
well lead to a conclusion that the effect is punitive and, therefore, the 
statute would no longer be deemed to be a civil one.423  The Circuit 
determined that if the conditions at the facility were as claimed, Young 
would be entitled to relief.  The case was remanded to the District Court 
to hold a fact finding hearing.424  No such hearing, however, was to take 
place; the Supreme Court granted the state’s request for cer 425
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the Circuit.426  An “as-
applied” analysis would prove unworkable because conditions at such 
facilities are subject to change.427  The Act was civil in accord with 
Hendricks, and could not be deemed to be punitive as applied to a single 
individual.428  There was, therefore, no valid Double Jeopardy claim.  
There could not be, as suggested by the dissent of Stephens, an inquiry 
into the “effects of the statue.”429  “Civil” is civil, treatment (even if 
there be none) is not punishment, loss of liberty for the duration of one’s 
lifetime is not punitive. 
Since the legislation of virtually all of the states provide for an 
indefinite period of commitment (subject to an annual review) the 
population in the facilities is an aging one.  These likely-to-commit-
future-sex-offense predators need wheelchairs and walkers, and senility 
is an increasing occurrence.430  Hendricks is now 72, but it’s certainly 
not expected that he’ll be released.  He has much company in Kansas, 
where the cost for the civil commitment of sex offenders has increased 
from $1.2 million in 2001 to $6.9 million in 2005.431 
XX.  THE DEALTH PENALTY FOR RAPE OF A CHILD 
The last time that someone was sentenced to the death penalty for 
rape was in Mississippi in 1964.432  The Supreme Court held, in 1977 in 
 421. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 422. Young, 192 F.3d at 874-75. 
 423. Id. at 873. 
 424. Id. at 877. 
 425. Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 267 (2001). 
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. at 263. 
 428. Id. at 267. 
 429. Id. at 275 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 430. Davey & Goodnough, supra note 410. 
 431. Id. 
 432. Corey Rayburn, Better Dead Than Raped?  The Patriarchal Rhetoric Driving Capital 
Rape Statutes, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1119, 1120 (2004). 
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Coker v. Georgia,433 that executions for rape violated the Eighth 
Amendment in that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.434  The 
plurality opinion of Justice White explained: 
[r]ape is without a doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms 
of moral depravity and of injury to the person and to the public, it does 
not compare with murderFalse  We have the abiding conviction that 
the death penalty, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability, is 
an excessive penalty for the rapist.435 
Justices Blackman, Stevens, and Stewart joined Justice White; 
Justices Brennan436 and Marshall’s437 separate concurrences reflected 
their determinations that the death penalty in all circumstances is cruel 
and unusual punishment.  Justice Powell concurred in the judgment 
because he concluded that the rape in this case was not one of excessive 
brutality and no serious, longlasting injuries had resulted.438  The dissent 
of Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, opined that 
legislating in this matter should be left to the states, and the federal 
courts should not intervene.439 
As a result of Coker, there was no statute in the country providing 
for the death penalty for rape until Louisiana enacted such a law in 
1995.440  The statute initially provided for a possible death sentence 
when there is oral, anal, or vaginal intercourse with someone under the 
age of twelve,441 but the law was subsequently amended to make the age 
under thirteen.442  The Louisiana Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of the statute the next year in State v. Wilson and 
Bethley,443 because two different lower courts had quashed indictments 
finding the statute to be unconstitutional.444  The state supreme court 
held that the death sentence was not excessive and that the Louisiana 
 433. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
 434. Id. at 592. 
 435. Id. at 598.  The decision certainly did not diminish the severity of the act of rape: “It is 
highly reprehensible, both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt of the person integrity 
and autonomy of the female victim . . . .  Short of homicide, it is the ultimate violation of self.”  Id. 
at 597. 
 436. Id. at 600. 
 437. Id. 
 438. Id. at 601. 
 439. Id. at. 604. 
 440. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(D)(2)(a) (1997). 
 441. § 14:42 (D)(2). 
 442. See § 14:42 (A)(4). 
 443. State v. Wilson, 685 So.2d 1063 (La. 1996). 
 444. Id. at 1065. 
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statute was significantly different from the situation that the Supreme 
Court had considered in Coker.  The Louisiana court noted that the 
Supreme Court referred fourteen times in its Coker decision to the 
victim as an adult woman.445 
The Louisiana court concluded that due to the adult/child 
distinction, Coker did not directly apply to the newly-enacted statute.  
The court concluded that “given the appalling nature of the crime, the 
severity of the harm inflicted upon the victim, and the harm imposed on 
society, the death penalty is not an excessive penalty for the crime of 
rape when the victim is a child under the age of twelve years old.”446  
The U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, emphasizing the 
jurisdictional problem in this pre-enforcement challenge to the law—the 
petitioner had neither been convicted nor sentenced.447 
Within several years of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, 
five other states – Oklahoma,448 Montana,449 Texas,450 South Carolina451 
and Georgia452—started the process of enacting statutes providing for 
the death penalty for rape of a juvenile.  But it was Louisiana that first 
actually imposed the sentence of death for the commission of a rape.  In 
January, 2008, the Supreme Court agreed to review the sentence of the 
defendant and determine whether the imposition of a death sentence for 
the rape of a child was constitutional.  Shortly before the petition for 
certiorari was granted,453 a second individual in Louisiana was also 
convicted of rape and was scheduled to receive a sentence of death as 
well.454  These are the only two individuals in the country who are on 
death row for the commission of a crime other than homicide.455 
The individual sentenced to death in the case before the Supreme 
Court, Patrick Kennedy, is a forty-three year old African American 
 445. Id. at 1066 n.2 (providing the fourteen excerpts from the Coker decision, each about one 
sentence in length). 
 446. Id. at 1070. 
 447. Bethley v. Louisiana, 520 U.S. 1259, 1259 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 448. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7115(K) (West 2008). 
 449. MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-503(3)(c)(i) (2008). 
 450. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(c)(3) (Vernon 2007). 
 451. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-655 (c)(I) (2007). 
 452. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-1(a)(1)(2) (2007). 
 453. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 957 So.2d 757 (La. 2007), cert. granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3113 (Jan. 4, 
2008). 
 454. Letter from Jeffrey L. Fisher, Counsel for Petitioner, Stanford Legal Clinic, to the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court of the United States Re: Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (December 13, 
2007). 
 455. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, Court to Rule on Death Penalty for Child 
Rape, http://www.ScotUSblog.com/wp/court-to-rule-on-death-penalty (Jan. 4, 2008, 2:58 EST). 
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whose IQ has been measured at 70.456  His only prior convictions were 
for writing five worthless checks between the years 1987 and 1992.457  
Race has long been a factor both in the prosecution of rape in this 
country and in the implementation of the death penalty.  In the pre-Civil 
war south, slaves convicted of rape were hung, whereas whites so 
convicted were not.458  During the years 1930-1964, 89% of those who 
had been executed for rape were black.459  And in the state of Louisiana, 
every single one of the fourteen men executed for rape during that period 
was black.460 
A major concern in any consideration of a child rape statute is the 
reliability of a child witness. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the case before 
the Supreme Court, the alleged victim was eight at the time of the rape 
and had initially claimed that two boys on a bicycle had taken her from 
the garage and one of the boys attacked her in the yard.461  This account 
is what the girl repeatedly told the police, doctors, her mother, 
investigators, a psychologist and a social worker.462  The girl continued 
with this version of the event until she told her mother, twenty-one 
months later, that it was Kennedy who had raped her.463  An Amicus 
Curiae brief filed on behalf of the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers focused on children as witnesses and maintained that 
“[h]istory is replete with examples of damning false accusations made 
by children . . . .”464  It surely is the case that children may be 
particularly susceptible to suggestions by others, even if the form of 
suggestion is as apparently benign as repeated questioning by those in 
position of authority.465 
 456. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2007) (No. 07-
343). 
 457. Id. 
 458. Id. at 21 (citing STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY:  AN AMERICAN HISTORY 139-42 
(2002)). 
 459. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 829 (2007) (No. 07-
343) (citing United States Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, National Prisoner Statistics, Bulletin 
No. 45, Capital Punishment 1930-1967, at 7 (Aug. 1969)). 
 460. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-343). 
 461. Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-343), 
2007 WL 4104370. 
 462. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Petitioner at 9, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-343), 2007 WL 4104371. 
 463. Brief in Opposition to Petition of Certiorari at 6-12, Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829 (No. 07-
343), 2007 WL 4104370. 
 464. Brief of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, supra note, 462, at 4. 
 465. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ceci, Maggie Bruck & Robert Rosenthal, Children’s Allegations of 
Sexual Abuse:  Forensic and Scientific Issues, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 494, 506 (1995) (noting 
that scientific research clearly shows that some children make false claims of sexual abuse when 
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XXI.  ANALYSIS OF THE ECOND WAVE OF RAPE 
ting problems which make a conviction 
so di
 
The focus of the Supreme Court’s decision will undoubtedly be on 
the issue of whether or not a sentence of death for child rape is grossly 
disproportionate, excessive, and in violation of the Eight Amendment 
protection against cruel and unusual punishment.  The Louisiana statute 
encompasses not just vaginal intercourse but also deems oral-genital 
contact466 a capital crime.467  There is no requirement that the child 
under the age of thirteen was in any manner forced to engage in the 
sexual contact.  Mistake of fact as to the age of the victim is not
468
IMPACT OF THE S
REFORM LAWS 
Will the Second Wave reforms be more of a success in terms of 
impact than the original reforms had been?  If prison sentences are 
longer, if sex offenders are civilly committed469 and not walking the 
streets or going to bars, if death awaits the rapist of a child,470 then 
predators who might pose threats may simply not be able to attack 
members of the community.  It is more difficult to see what benefits can 
come from the sexual registry statutes,471 but all of these post-conviction 
reforms depend upon a conviction of the individual who did commit the 
crime of rape.  And the long exis
fficult to achieve, continue. 
In any “He said, She said” battle, the prosecutor’s burden of proof 
creates a very real obstacle.  Even were a jury to be more persuaded by 
the alleged victim’s account than that of the defendant, such does not 
necessarily lead to a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Corroboration may not be legally required any longer,472 but jurors may 
still wish to see more evidence than just the claim of the woman.  And 
adults in position of power pursue them with suggestive comments); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 
836, 868 (1990) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (suspicion of child testimony is warranted because studies 
have demonstrated that children are “substantially more vulnerable to suggestion than adults . . . .”). 
 466. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A) (2008). 
 467. § 14:42(D)(2).  See also Brief of the National Association of Social Workers, the 
Louisiana Foundation Against Sexual Assault, the Texas Association Against Sexual Assault, and 
the National Alliance to End Sexual Violence as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 
Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. 829, (No. 07-343), 2007 WL 3444963. 
 468. LA.  REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:42(A)(4) (2008) (“Lack of knowledge of the victim’s age shall 
not be a defense.”). 
 469. See supra notes 377-431 and accompanying text. 
 470. See supra notes 432-467 and accompanying text. 
 471. See supra notes 350-375 and accompanying text. 
 472. See supra notes 23-36 and accompanying text. 
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way to curry the favor of interest groups that may be needed either for 
 
biases, perhaps more common amongst male than female jurors, 
continue.  If a woman was at a bar drinking late at night and then went to 
the apartment of a man she had never met before, many jurors will think 
“she was asking for it”even if they are never permitted to be informed of 
the clothing the woman was wearing.473  Many still tolerate, if not 
admire, the sexually active and aggressive man while viewing such a 
woman as promiscuous and loose.  The stereotyping will continue even 
if the woman is shielded from questions about her prior sexual history.  
Her motive for finally telling people she was raped only after much time 
had passed since the alleged attack will still be suspect even after a ra
a syndrome expert explains that many women react that way.474 
No shield laws protect the jurors from finding out that the woman 
had a lot to drink that night, and the jury then concluding that the alcohol 
may have lowered the woman’s inhibitions.  The jurors will know about 
any past drug use or mental history or prior criminal record or motive to 
lie.  Jurors might be influenced by the highly publicized occasions when 
women may well have lied about being raped – whether the defendant 
was a Duke University lacrosse player475 or Kobe Bryant.476  A woman 
who has indeed been raped may simply not want to press charges and 
face a trial where the mere recounting of the events may lead to a 
retraumatizing of the horrible sexual assault.  And whatever instructions 
the jurors may receive on affirmative consent, if the jury concludes that 
the defendant reasonably
ittal may still result. 
But, however influenced jurors might be by their prejudices, bias, 
and overall suspicions of the claim of rape, judges may act quite 
differently.  The vast majority of criminal cases, including rape, do not 
go to trial.477  Defendants often are persuaded by a judge’s assessment of 
a case and by the judge’s pressure on the defendant to enter a guilty plea.  
Whether judges are appointed or elected, they know there is little 
sympathy for the person charged with rape.  Judges may not be eager to 
preside over a trial where a defendant is acquitted of rape, that is not the 
 473. See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text. 
 474. See supra notes 236-261 and accompanying text. 
 475. See supra note 300. 
 476. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text. 
 477. In 2004, the last year for which statistics are available, 83% of all those convicted of rape 
had entered a guilty plea, 13% of convictions resulted from a jury trial and 3% from a bench trial.  
Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department of Justice, State Court Sentencing of 
Convicted Felons 2004: Distribution of types of felony convictions in State courts, by offense, 2004, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04401tab.htm. 
70
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 4, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss4/7
KLEIN_FINAL 3/23/2009  3:19 PM 
2008] AN ANALYSIS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF RAPE REFORM 1051 
sed. 
 
reappointment or for promotion to a higher court.478  Political 
correctness does not cease when one enters the door of a courtroom.  
There is much a judge can do to affect the outcome of a trial – 
evidentiary rulings deciding motions, the extent of discovery permitted, 
treatment of witnesses and counsel, and the instructions to the jurors 
may all carry great weight.479  Jurors often look to the trial judge for 
cues as to the guilt or innocence of the accu
The defendant who is aware of how he will be restricted at the trial 
regarding cross examining his accuser, while also knowing that any prior 
record of his relating to sexual offenses will become known to the jury, 
may be quite tempted to plead guilty to avoid trial.  The defendant will 
know that many potential jurors have been greatly influenced by 
society’s change in perspective of the severity of sexual assault and that 
many female jurors would not be eager to tell friends and colleagues that 
they voted to acquit, and therefore free, a man charged with rape.480  If 
the defendant is a black man and his accuser white, any calculation as to 
the risk of going to trial will consider the possible impact of race on the 
jurors.  The existence of the sexual offender registry laws provide 
prosecutors with a strengthened hand in plea bargaining in that a 
defendant may readily plead guilty to a reduced charge that would not 
require registering as a sexual predator upon completion of his 
incarceration. 
XXII.  CONCLUSION 
To be sure, the rape laws that existed in the early 1970s needed to 
be reformed.  They reflected age-old prejudices and unfair, pervasive 
doubts about the credibility of any woman who claimed to have been 
 478. An example of how judges perceive and respond to the public’s attitude to those accused 
of rape is illustrated by a recent study of judges in Pennsylvania.  It was found that judges as their 
re-election approached, increased their sentences for those who were convicted of rape.  Adam 
Liptak, Rendering Justice With One Eye on Re-election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2008, at A1. 
 479. For a comprehensive discussion of the varying ways that a judge can influence the course 
of a trial and affect the outcome, see Richard Klein, Due Process Denied: Judicial Coercion in the 
Plea Bargaining Process, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1349, 1401-04 (2004). 
 480. Attempts continue to educate Americans about the frequency of rape as well as its 
devastating impact on victims.  April, for example, is Sexual Assault Awareness Month and Take 
Back the Night demonstrations occur at college campuses throughout the country.  Susan Dominus, 
Rape Worn Not on a Sleeve, But Right Over the Heart, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2008, at B2.  One 
addition to the Take Back the Night rallies this year is expected to be the weaving of T-shirts 
emblazoned with the word “Raped” on the front.  The goal of those who designed the shirt is to 
encourage everyday conversation about rape and to diminish the guilt and shame that may afflict 
victims.  Id. 
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raped.  When a woman did decide to confront the criminal justice system 
and pursue criminal charges against her attacker, she was met with 
obstacles that the legal system had put into place to thwart a fair 
resolution of her charges.  The law wouldn’t accept her word alone, and 
even though rapes are almost always done in a private setting with no 
witnesses present, corroboration was required.481  It was expected that if 
a woman really had not consented to the intercourse she would have 
“resisted to the utmost” in spite of the use of overwhelming physical 
force against her.482  If the charges did survive the legal impediments 
that were in place and the woman testified at trial, her prior sexual 
relations would be revealed with subsequent attacks on her character.483  
And if the case reached the point where the judge instructed the jurors, 
the judge would inform the jury of the need to be suspicious of any 
claim by a woman that she was raped.484  Husbands were protected as a 
matter of law – by definition, a husband’s forcible sexual assault of his 
wife would not constitute rape.485  But, have the reforms that were 
designed to counter such inequities gone too far?  Have the Due Process 
rights that must be afforded any individual charged with a crime been 
sacrificed when the charge is rape?  Has the pendulum swung so far as to 
create a system of policies and laws that are fundamentally unfair?486 
To fully answer that question, one must look at the reforms in their 
totality.  It might well be the case that any single legislative reform was 
justifiable, but have the odds against the defendant become inappropriate 
and unjust in a criminal justice system that champions its unique place in 
the world because of its protections for those charged with crime?  Has 
 481. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.  The American Bar Association was an 
early critic of the corroboration requirement.  In 1975, the House of Delegates approved a 
Resolution in support of the elimination of laws mandating corroboration as part of an overall call 
for the “development of new procedures for police and prosecutors in processing rape cases.”  
House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges redefinition of Rape, and Undoes the Houston 
Amendments, 61 A.B.A. J. 463 (1975). 
 482. See supra notes 37-56 and accompanying text. 
 483. See supra notes 57-97 and accompanying text. 
 484. Id. 
 485. See supra notes 123-138 and accompanying text. 
 486. The need to compensate for past inequities became a perspective of judges as well as 
reformers.  One Pennsylvania Supreme Court Judge wrote that he believed it was necessary 
to emphasize the appalling truth that the law – the criminal justice system – has not been 
a mere passive observer to the legal injustice perpetrated upon the rape victim, or to the 
legal bonanza afforded the rapist.  It is fitting then that the law generally, and this Court 
particularly, embrace this opportunity to help to rectify the imbalance, to actively and 
affirmatively encourage the physical and psychological treatment of rape victims and the 
reporting of the crime to the police. 
In re Pittsburgh Action Against Rape, 482 A.2d 126, 143 (Pa. 1981) (Larsen, J., dissenting). 
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the crime of rape become an exception to these protections, and if so, 
should it be? 
Some of the reforms are of particular concern.  Foremost, perhaps, 
is the abolition in some jurisdictions of the requirement that in order to 
hold an individual responsible for a criminal act, that person must have 
had a mens rea, a guilty mind.  For one to be guilty of a crime in our 
justice system, it has historically been required that the individual 
possessed the intention to cause harm, or the knowledge that he was 
causing harm.487  No conviction where the loss of liberty may be as 
severe as it is for rape should result if the defendant had no mens rea; 
this is a basic and an extraordinarily vital aspect of our system of 
criminal justice.488 
Yet, the doctrine of affirmative consent and the decisions of some 
states to extend that concept even further, are deemed by some to be 
progressive reforms.  Silence, preceding and during sexual relations, 
ought not be deemed sufficient to transform intercourse into a rape.  In 
some jurisdictions, an accused can be convicted even if he believed there 
was consent, even if such a belief was a reasonable one,489 and even if 
there was no indication whatsoever, no physical or verbal resistance, of 
the lack of desire for the intercourse. 
A defense of mistake of fact – that the defendant was truly mistaken 
about a requisite element of the offense – is a valid and long recognized 
defense in our justice system.490  But, increasingly, not for the crime of 
rape.  Strict liability, a principal of criminal law most commonly 
reserved for minor offenses, may apply; rape, according to the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Maine, “requires no culpable state of mind.”491 
In criminal cases, the burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and the 
standard is beyond a reasonable doubt.  But, for those states that have 
not adopted a strict liability perspective of rape and still permit the 
defendant’s belief that there was consent to be a defense to the charge, 
the defendant may well have the burden of proof.  Instead of the 
historical requirement that the state prove each element of the offense – 
 487. Some criminal statutes, generally signifying less serious offenses, identify the requisite 
mens rea as recklessness or negligence.  The definitions of each of these concepts lack precision, 
and there is frequent disagreement among courts as to their meaning.  See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, 
supra note 35, at 220-21. 
 488. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (due process requires that the burden is on 
the state to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt).  The mens rea identified 
within a statute is a crucial element of a criminal offense. 
 489. See supra notes 152-206 and accompanying text. 
 490. State v. Glenn Reid, 479 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1984). 
 491. See supra note 227 and accompanying text. 
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and lack of consent is the crucial element – it now may well be the case 
that the defendant must prove there was consent by a preponderance of 
the evidence.492  And in the eyes of some rape reform advocates, sexual 
intercourse should be deemed rape even if there was consent at the time, 
but afterwards the woman felt as though she’s been violated.493 
A defendant’s ability to even establish that there is a reasonable 
doubt that he committed the rape has certainly been made more difficult 
in recent years.  Rape shield laws, precluding a defendant from 
conducting a cross examination of his accuser that would inquire about 
her prior sexual conduct, have been expanded in ways that could not 
have been foreseen when the initial legislation was passed.  Desire by 
judges to comply with “the spirit” of such laws has led to situations 
where jurors are denied knowledge of events that occurred prior to the 
rape that are crucial for any proper assessment of the credibility of the 
alleged victim.494 
It is not just the state’s control over what the jury may learn about 
what the woman had done or said prior to the rape that may determine 
the outcome of the trial.  Recently-enacted statutes or court holdings 
now permit a prosecutor to call an expert witness to explain the woman’s 
conduct after the alleged rape when there is concern that such conduct 
may be perceived by jurors to be inconsistent with that of a true rape 
victim.  Testimony by a rape trauma syndrome expert will explain why 
the alleged victim told no one about the horrible attack for many days or 
months.495  Jurors will hear how women other than the complainant have 
been terribly traumatized by a rape, and how their lives have been 
destroyed.496  Such testimony, certain to elicit great sympathy from the 
jurors, occurs even though the expert has never met or spoken with the 
alleged victim in the case on trial.497  The mere fact that the rape trauma 
expert is permitted to testify will infer to the jurors that there has been a 
determination by the expert, and perhaps by the judge as well, that the 
complainant was raped.498  That is prejudicial, and perhaps 
overwhelmingly so.  It is the very essence of prejudice for juries to make 
 492. See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 147 P.3d 1201 (Wash. 2006). 
 493. CATHERINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 82 
(1987). 
 494. See supra notes 98-121 and accompanying text. 
 495. See supra notes 236-261 and accompanying text. 
 496. See supra notes 260-261 and accompanying text. 
 497. See supra notes 258-259 and accompanying text. 
 498. See supra notes 236-261 and accompanying text. 
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emotionally-based decisions which may not have been founded on hard, 
real, and relevant evidence. 
Whereas the alleged victim may be shielded from relevant 
questions being asked about her past even though victims of other 
crimes receive no similar protections, the defendant himself receives 
significantly less protection if he is charged with rape than would 
normally be the case in a criminal matter.  Traditionally, juries are not 
permitted to be informed of the defendant’s prior criminal record due to 
the prejudice that might attach.499  In a rape case, however, propensity 
evidence is admissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 413 provides that 
when, and only when, the defendant is accused of a sexual assault, 
evidence of prior sexual assault offenses are admissible.500  The 
“evidence” is not limited to convictions – uncharged crimes may be 
admissible, arrests that never led to prosecution are admissible.  The 
testimony of someone coming forward in 2008 to claim that in 1998 the 
defendant had sexually assaulted her is admissible even though that 
individual had never informed anyone previously of any assault.  The 
undue prejudice that could well result against the accused501 was of no 
import to the legislators in Congress, the Congressional concern was 
centered on the goal of increasing the likelihood of a conviction of 
someone charged with rape.502 
Whereas previously unproven accusations can be admitted into 
evidence against the defendant, the very identity of the defendant’s 
accuser for the instant case may not be revealed.  Newspapers will shout 
out the name of a well known sports figure or celebrity who has been 
accused of rape, but will not reveal the identity of the accuser.  The 
media will provide protection to the accuser either voluntarily, through 
self-censorship, or in compliance with the laws that exist in an 
increasing number of states.503  Such policies undermine the 
presumption of innocence.  The rationale for not revealing the accuser’s 
name is to protect her from further humiliation and victimization; she 
has been victimized once by the defendant, it should not happen again.  
Such protection is based on an assumption that the woman has been the 
victim of a rape by the defendant, she has been severely harmed, she has 
been violated, her identity needs to be withheld—she has been raped. 
Statutes prohibiting any mention of the clothing the accuser was 
 499. See supra notes 266-276 and accompanying text. 
 500. See supra notes 268-276 and accompanying text. 
 501. See supra notes 326-349 and accompanying text. 
 502. See supra notes 269-270 and accompanying text. 
 503. See supra notes 257-300 and accompanying text. 
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wearing before the intercourse occurred may appear to be non-
controversial and clearly desirable.504  After all, how is the dress of the 
woman possibly indicative of whether she had consented to have 
intercourse with the defendant?  But if such information clearly was not 
relevant, then no special statutes would be required to prohibit 
admissibility.  The fear is that jurors might find descriptions or 
photographs of the woman’s outfit to be all too relevant.  “We can’t trust 
the jurors” is the rationale for exclusion.  The jurors may conclude that 
the woman was leading the defendant on by the see-through blouse and 
very short skirt.  Or, a juror might feel that the accuser “was asking for 
it.”  Stereotypes certainly do still haunt us – there’s the “bad girl,” and 
the “good girl.” 
But is it fundamentally fair to keep some truths out of the truth-
finding process?  Is justice best served by limiting information for those 
who must make the very hard choice in determining who is telling the 
truth?  If the defendant’s claim is that he believed there to be consent, 
isn’t it necessary for the jury to develop a complete understanding of 
whatever factors he maintains may have played a role in the formation of 
his belief?  And doesn’t that include an understanding of the alleged 
victim’s communications and conduct leading up to the sexual 
interaction?  There is a clear distinction between evidence being 
admissible as relevant and it being deemed decisive and conclusive.  
Shouldn’t a jury have all the facts before it, including all of the 
information that may have some degree of relevance, some degree of 
materiality prior to reaching a decision that could lead to the accused 
losing his liberty for the rest of his life?  If one is to err, shouldn’t the 
choice be to permit evidence in and allow the jury to determine what if 
any weight ought be given to the evidence?  And, as part of the jury’s 
assessment, the prosecutor on closing argument is always free to 
maintain and attempt to persuade the jurors that they should give no 
weight whatsoever to any information regarding the background of the 
accuser or her prior relationship with the defendant. 
Reforms of rape laws have had very substantial impact on what 
happens after any conviction.  Even if one escapes a sentence of life in 
prison, punishment hardly ends upon release from incarceration.  Civil 
commitment of a convicted sex offender occurs with increasing 
frequency, and such internment can most certainly be for life.505  If, 
however, one is not so detained in an effort by the state to hospitalize 
 504. See supra notes 301-313 and accompanying text. 
 505. See supra notes 377 -431 and accompanying text. 
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people for crimes they may commit in the future, then compliance with 
sex registry laws as a sexual predator awaits.  Social isolation, verbal 
and physical attacks from neighbors, and the inability to attain 
employment or housing are just some of the ramifications of this 
particular reform.506  And the branding as a sexual offender may 
continue for the remainder of one’s life.507 
The goals of the reformists were not just to change the laws relating 
to rape, but to change society’s view regarding the need for women to 
have autonomy in sexual relations.  Criminal laws concerning rape were 
seen as instruments to attain the broader goal of educating the 
community, much as the early laws of the civil rights movement had an 
impact on changing the popular culture as to racial matters.508  But is it 
fair to convict any single individual and deprive him of his liberty in 
what may be an unjust and unfair proceeding in order to “create a new 
cultural understanding of female sexuality?”509  Should any individual 
accused of rape be denied the opportunity to present relevant testimony 
on his own behalf, a right which the Supreme Court deemed to be a 
“fundamental element of due process law?”510 
The laws concerning rape which were in existence in the 1970s 
reflected centuries of stereotypical thinking about a woman who accused 
a man of sexual assault.  Reforms were needed, and radical revisions 
ensued.  There are, however, serious concerns which now must be 
addressed regarding the nature and extent of these reforms.  The vast 
majority of all of the exonerations in this country as of 2008 which were 
based on DNA evidence have been for those wrongfully convicted of 
rape.511  A trial which may have been fundamentally unfair to the 
accused is a very high, and unjust price to pay for the pervasive changes 
in the laws relating to rape. 
 506. See supra notes 350-376 and accompanying text. 
 507. See id.  Whereas sexual predator registries have the effect of creating many obstacles in 
the way of ex-offenders re-integrating into society, attempts proceed to help others get community 
support as they are released from prison.  See e.g., David Gonzales, With An Ex-Inmate’s Help, 
Returning to Life Outside, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at B1. 
 508. See Little, supra note 20, at 1356. 
 509. PEGGY REEVES, A WOMAN SCORNED: ACQUAINTANCE RAPE ON TRIAL 292 (1996). 
 510. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
 511. Adam Liptak, Consensus On Counting The Innocent: We Can’t, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 
2008, at A14 (noting that “almost all” of DNA exonerations have been in rape cases according to 
the Innocence Project).  See also Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised By Rape Trials, 76 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1585, 1590 n.25 (2002) (noting most of those shown to have been wrongfully 
convicted had been convicted of rape). 
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